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Dreyer: Dryer: Litigation Management Proposals:

LITIGATION MANAGEMENT
PROPOSALS: STORM CLOUDS
FOR VOLUNTARY ADR?
Leo Dreyer*
I. INTRODUCTION
Increasingly the courts and commentators are addressing concerns regarding
the complexity of, and delays in, civil litigation. These problems are magnified
by the growing demands placed upon the judicial system by the "war on drugs"
and the general increase in the criminal docket.
In response to these concerns, a number of proposals have surfaced either in
the form of proposals for legislation, or in the form of legislation actually
introduced in Congress, which would address the handling of civil litigation.
Frequently these proposals focus upon case management solutions to try to
streamline the civil litigation process and otherwise make it more efficient, particularly in the handling of large and complex cases. In this general context, there are
also frequently companion recommendations to introduce various forms of courtannexed alternative dispute resolution.
This Article will examine in detail some of the current reform proposals
relating to case management of civil litigation and court-annexed alternative
dispute resolution. These projects or proposals, discussed in more detail in
ensuing sections, include the Final Report and Recommendations of the ABA
Special Commission on Mass Torts,' the ALI Complex Litigation Project,' the
Report of the Federal Courts Study Committee, 3 the Multiparty, Multiforum
Jurisdiction Bill of 1989, 4 and the Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990 along with
the underlying Report of the Civil Litigation Project.5
Although some might argue that it is counterproductive to discuss current
evolving litigation management proposals before any are enacted into law, it is not
any one proposal which is of primary interest. Rather, it is the contemporaneous
emergence of a number of propbsals which, in varying degrees, all call for forced
consolidation of cases in multicase, multiforum litigation. In proposals such as the
ALI proposal, consolidation cuts across traditional concerns of federalism,
including consolidation of both federal and state cases in one transferee court.
The Article will examine these proposals from the standpoint of determining
whether the case management and court-annexed alternative dispute resolution
proposals are intended to try to increase judicial efficiency in managing litigation,

*
J.D., University of Kansas Law School, 1972. Mr. Dreyer is a partner at Shook, Hardy &
Bacon, Kansas City, Missouri, and is licensed to practice in both Kansas and Missouri. He is Shook,
Hardy & Bacon's membership liaison to the American Arbitration Association and to the Center for
Public Resources Legal Program. He is also on the American Arbitration Association's Panel of
Commercial Arbitrators.
1. See infra note 9.

2. See infra note 61.
3. See infra note 126.
4. See infra note 139.

5. See infra notes 145-54.
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or, are indeed, intended to provide alternative methods for resolving disputes.
This Article will then examine whether a more appropriate focus of the civil
litigation reform movement, insofar as it concerns alternative dispute resolution,
would be to create and stimulate avenues for voluntary dispute resolution, at least
with respect to commercial claims, using the full array of alternative dispute
resolution techniques which are presently available. In other words, regardless of
which specific proposals for legislation are "on the table," should the civil
litigation "reform" focus be directed toward some form of the multidoor courthouse, 6 early neutral evaluation,7 or other voluntary ADR program rather than
centralized, consolidated case management and mandatory court-annexed
alternative dispute resolution? Should parties be forced into ADR which they do
not want?

II. REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS
OF THE ABA SPECIAL COMMISSION
ON MASS TORTS

The ABA's McKay Commission made a recommendation several years ago
that a Special Commission of the ABA be appointed to study the handling of mass
tort litigation in federal and state courts." The ABA Special Commission on Mass
Torts which was subsequently appointed developed recommendations which called
for special federal legislation to create procedures for handling mass torts.9

6. Kessler & Finkelstein, The Evolution of A Multi-Door Courthouse,37 CATH. U. L REv. 577
(1988). As stated by the authors:
Professor Frank E. A. Sander of Harvard Law School first articulated the multi-door courthouse concept in April 1987 at a conference convened by Chief Justice Warren Burger
to address the problems faced by judges in the administration of justice. Professor Sander
envisioned the courthouse of the future as a dispute resolution center offering an array of
options for the resolution of legal disputes. litigation would be one option among many
including conciliation, mediation, arbitration and ombudspeople.
Id.
7. Brazil, et al., Early NeutralEvaluation:An ExperimentalEffort to ExpediteDispute Resolution,
69 JuICAITURE 279 (1986). See also Levine, Early Neutral Evaluation: The Second Phase, 1989 J.
DIsp. RESOL 1.

8. Report of the ABA Action Commission to Improve the Tort liability System (1987); McKay,
Rethinking the Tort Reform Liability System: A Report from the ABA Action Commission, 32 VILL.
L REv. 1219, 1230 (1987).
9. Final Report and Recommendations of the ABA Special Commission on Mass Torts (Nov. 18,

1989) [hereinafter Final Report]. An article by Michael Hoenig provides the following background:
What is the "Commission on Mass Torts" and what are its major proposals? The commission consists of 12 distinguished lawyers and jurists including: two outstanding plaintiff's
counsel; a general counsel for an insurance carrier; a general counsel for a pharmaceutical
manufacturer; three skilled defense counsel; a law professor; a Special Master in the
Agent Orange litigation; two federal judges; and one state Supreme Court Justice. Many
of the commissioners have had experience with so-called "mass tort" litigation including
the Copper 7 IUD, Dalkon Shield, asbestos, DES, swine flu vaccine and MGM Grand
Hotel fire. Unquestionably, these legal experts are "heavyweights" in talent and
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Although the Commission's recommendations have not been adopted by its ABA
House of Delegates, they do serve as an outline of its road to consolidation that
some would urge.
The Final Report of the ABA Special Commission develops a comprehensive
program for consolidation of mass tort cases and coordinated judicial management
of mass tort cases before a single transferee court. "A fundamental premise of
[the Final Report] is that separate adjudication of individual tort claims arising
from a single accident or use of or exposure to the same product or substance is
inefficient and wasteful, seriously burdens both state and federal judicial systems,
poses unacceptably high risks of inconsistent results, and contributes to public
dissatisfaction with [the civil justice system]."' In this regard, the Final Report
embraces the thinking of the prior ABA Action Commission and concludes:
[T]here is a pressing need for more effective judicial management of
mass tort cases. This means, at the outset, devising better strategies for
consolidating the voluminous number of claims, often dispersed in state
and federal courts across the nation, in a single jurisdiction and treating
those claims (to the extent appropriate) as a class action. The present
procedural devices in the federal system for effecting such consolidation
. . . by common assent are not adequate to the task of efficient
disposition of mass tort cases."
It seems clear that the Final Report of the ABA Special Commission focuses
upon the case management aspects of consolidated, mass tort litigation. The
approach is one of trying to foster judicial efficiency through coordinated case
management.
A. Case Management Through Forced Consolidation
The principal or "centerpiece" recommendation of the Final Report of the
ABA Special Commission is to establish a federal judicial panel to determine that
tort actions constitute "mass tort litigation" whenever at least 250 civil tort claims

specialization with which to tackle many of the problems of true "mass" torts. Such
illustrious expertise aside, the major question nevertheless is whether the proposed plan
is worthy of adoption on its merits.
In August 1989, the commission issued its 76-page "Report and Recommendations"
to which are added various appendices. Eleven members "joined" in the work product.
One commissioner, however, Paul D. Rheingold, a noted plaintiffs' attorney with vast
experience in mass litigations, "dissented" and filed a thoughtful "Separate Statement" that
is contained in Appendix E. Mr. Rheingold states that the commission's solution "is both
too weak for true mass torts and unnecessarily intrusive for routine mass torts."
Hoenig, The ABA Mass Tort Proposal, N.Y.U. 3 (Jan. 25, 1990).
10. Final Report, supra note 9, at 12.
11. Id. at 12 (quoting Report of the Action Commission to Improve the Tort Liability System 42
(1988)).
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arise from single accident or use of or exposure to the same product or substance,
and each involves a claim in excess of $50,000.12
In aggregating such claims, the claims may be pending in different federal
district courts, in one federal district court,
or in one or more state courts. If the judicial panel declares the litigation to be
"mass tort litigation," under the legislation proposed by the ABA Special
Commission the mass tort claims would be deemed to arise under the laws of the
United States. The district courts would have original jurisdiction of all suits and
any party to such an action filed in or pending before a state court could remove
the action to the transferee district13court which the judicial panel had designated
to handle the consolidated cases.
The Final Report makes 13 specific recommendations. In addition to the
Recommendations discussed above, the Final Report also recommends:
4. When state law provides the rule of decision in the cases,
the presiding federal court should select applicable state(s)
law(s) by choice of law standards developed by the federal
courts in light of reason and experience.

8. A court should be empowered to require the parties to
engage in alternative dispute resolution procedures on any
individual issue provided, however, that the right to trial by
jury shall not thereby be denied or impaired[.]'
As noted above, the Final Report defines "mass tort litigation" as "situations
arising from a single accident or use of or exposure to the same product or
substance which involve tort claims in excess of $50,000 for death, serious
personal injury or substantial property damage asserted by at least one hundred
persons.""5
In addition to "single event catastrophes" such as the Kansas City, Missouri,
Hyatt Regency Skywalk disaster, the Final Report focuses upon products liability
litigation, including a "tort claim for death, serious personal injury or substantial
property damage which arises from an allegedly defective or negligently designed
product."' 6 The Final Report divides these "products liability cases" into two
categories: (a) "toxic tort litigation" and (b) "traditional products liability
litigation." 7

12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.

Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id.

30-32.
iv, 49, 3d (Section 104 of the proposed federal statutes).
iv-vi.
5-6, 2d.
7.
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The "toxic tort litigation" is described in the Final Report as follows:
Toxic tort litigation involving claims that use of or exposure to a
product (including pharmaceutical drugs or medical devices) has
produced an illness or condition is an increasingly common kind of
product liability litigation.

Many of these cases press the frontiers of medical and scientific
knowledge. Unlike a single mass accident, these claims arise at
different times, and it is frequently impossible to identify all actual or
potential plaintiffs. Unlike a traditional product liability case, it is often
impossible to limit the extent of resulting injury by recalling a defective
product. Moreover, many of these cases involve injuries alleged to
develop after a long latency period between use of or exposure to the
product and manifestation of an illness. This circumstance often
presents an exceptionally difficult cluster of "causation"issues.
Common to these cases, or at least to all claims involving the same
illness or condition, are questions of negligence, defect and "general
cause," i.e., the capacity of the product to "cause" the illness, condition
or other injury at issue. While these cases often raise individual issues
concerning the nature and circumstances of each plaintiff's illness, the
cases are usually identified as "mass tort litigation" and efforts at some
form of consolidated or coordinated pretrial management or adjudication
are not uncommon.18
The Final Report then describes "traditional products liability litigation" as
follows:
Another group of product liability cases arises when many people
institute tort suits alleging that death, serious personal injury or
substantial property damage was caused by the same allegedly defective
or negligently designed product. Like the toxic tort cases, these claims
arise at different times. Frequently, individual issues arise concerning
a particular plaintiff's use of the product or the circumstances giving
rise to a particular claim. Unlike the toxic tort cases, however, these
cases usually involve traumatically-induced injury and therefore do not
ordinarily raise difficult causation issues. Multiple claims against the
manufacturer of a cigarette lighter, a motor vehicle, or a tire are
examples . .....

18. Id. at 8 (emphasis added).
19. Id. at 8-9.
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The Final Report provides the Commission's view of why the Commission
feels such changes involving multicase consolidation are necessary:
A fundamental premise of our report is that separate adjudication of
individual tort claims arising from a single accident or use of or
exposure to the same product or substance is inefficient and wasteful,
seriously burdens both state and federal judicial systems, poses
unacceptably high risks of inconsistent results, and contributes to public
dissatisfaction with the tort law system and the legal profession.

Accordingly, an important feature of our program is establishment
of a federal judicial panel empowered to make an initial determination
as to whether some or all individual cases should be consolidated before
a single federal court for some or all purposes .... If consolidation
before a federal court is directed, that court will have broad authority
to manage the litigation and it will be empowered, but not required, to
resolve all issues including liability and damages. 20
B. ConsolidationMechanics
The Final Report suggests that consolidation "is the single most promising
way to avoid inconsistent results, attain litigation economics, and promote the just
and speedy resolution of the controversy. 21 The Final Report states that:
[N]o well-developed proposal of which we are aware suggests consolidation of anything short of the common issues of law or fact.... The
legal system should be capable, we think, of providing a dispositive
answer to questions such as whether an air carrier properly maintained
an ill-fated aircraft, whether the fuel system of an automobile was
carefully designed and constructed, whether a pharmaceutical product
was adequately tested, whether the manufacturerof a productprovided
adequate directions or warnings, or whether an award of punitive
damages is appropriate.2
The Final Report does acknowledge "there will be individual questions
involving each plaintiff and there may also be issues involving different groups of
plaintiffs."2' It therefore advocates "flexibility whereby the judge presiding over
consolidated mass tort litigation may, as circumstances warrant, proceed to

20.
21.
22.
23.

Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at

12-13.
15-16.
19-20 (emphasis added).
20.
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adjudication of all issues, some issues or no issues at all."' This "flexibility"
should also be extended to determine what current claimants should be joined and
whether "future claimants" should similarly be required to be joined in the
In order to avoid the unlimited nature of such
consolidation proceedings.'
"future claimants," the Final Report explains it does "not believe a solvent
defendant should be forced to litigate in the name of 'global peace' tort claims
which have not and may never arise and we do not recommend mandatory 'class'
'
treatment for the 'claim' of 'future plaintiffs. ""a
The Final Report acknowledges, but is not persuaded by, the impact of the
consolidation on individual, independent litigation:
While consolidation necessarily requires litigants and their attorneys to
relinquish a level of control over presentation of individual cases, that
cost is not appreciably different from that which occurs in a class action
or proceedings consolidated under FED. R. Civ. P. 42(a) or 28 U.S.C.
§ 1407.27
The Final Report readily acknowledges that in any tort litigation which might be
subject to the consolidation provisions, "there will be individual questions
involving each plaintiff and there may also be issues involving different groups of
plaintiffs. " s It also concedes that a "single trial of all common and individual
issues arising in mass tort litigation affecting numerous plaintiffs and multiple
defendants is clearly impractical." 29 Although the Final Report senses the
difficulty consolidation poses for the fair litigation of individual claims, it
concludes, nonetheless, as follows:
Accordingly we favor legislation that affords the court an opportunity
to determine at an appropriate time and in the context of particular
litigation whether and to what extent common or individual issues will
be resolved. In making that determination, it is appropriate for the
court to weigh the likelihood of settlement after some individual claims

24. Id. at 21.

25. Id. at 22. "More troublesome issues are raised by proposals to include in mass tort litigation
all who have been exposed to a risk of illness or injury as a result of allegedly tortious activity but who
have not yet contracted that illness or sustained that injury." Id.
26. Id. at 23-24. With respect to the initial decision to consolidate, the Final Report also states:
[T]here may well be cases where consolidation of only those claims which arose before
or after a specified date or which involve only particular illnesses or conditions will
facilitate resolution of common questions offact or law. The Commission's proposal calls

for establishment of a judicial panel empowered to screen potentially related tort claims
and decide in the first instance whether some or all of the claims should be consolidated
before a federal court.
Id. at 26 (emphasis added).
27. Id. at 20.
28. Id.
29. Id.
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are evaluated by a jury or to employ other innovations tailored to the
fair and efficient disposition of the particular case.3"
Thus, although the Final Report recognizes the tension consolidation creates as to
the fair litigation of individual claims, its only solution to address that tension is
to accord the transferee court considerable power in sorting out common and
individual issues. However, even as to individual issues, there is no guarantee that
the litigants will have ready access to trial by jury. The resolution of individual
issues may be controlled by case management techniques of the transferee court,
which may include court-annexed, mandatory forms of alternative dispute
resolution. Thus, some might conclude that even as to individual issues, the
"consolidation model" proposed by the Final Report contemplates centralized
judicial management of the disposition of those individualized issues. Individual
lawsuits would become components in a larger grid of issues and parties, to be
addressed in the manner, under the schedule, and with the linkage to other issues,
as determined by the transferee court. The passages quoted above suggest and
imply that decisions of the transferee court regarding the handling of individual
issues may be made with an eye toward settlement.
C. Choice of Law in ConsolidatedActions
The Final Report recognizes the choice of law problems with multicase,
multiforum consolidation and notes that a "major obstacle to consolidated
adjudication of common factual issues is the fact that almost all of today's mass
tort cases arise under state substantive law."3 In order to avoid the traditional2
choice of law principles of Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Electric Manufacturing.Co.,
and thereby apply the choice-of-law rules of the state in which the court sits, the
Final Report raises
as one alternative "replac[ing state tort] law with a uniform
33
federal standard."
The Final Report contends that since mass tort consolidation "involves parties
engaged in or conduct affecting interstate commerce, there can be little doubt that
Congress would have the power to enact a uniform federal standard if it saw fit
to do so."' Nevertheless, the Commission acknowledges concern "with the
broader policy implications that necessarily attend a proposal to replace state tort
law with a uniform federal standard, and as a consequence rejects the idea of a
35
uniform federal standard."

30. Id. at 21.
31. Id. at 36.

32. 313 U.S. 487 (1941).
33. Final Report, supra note 9, at 37.
34. Id. at 37.
35. Id. at 37-38.
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The proposed federal statute set forth in the Final Report regarding the ABA
Special Commission's recommendations concerning choice of law provides as
follows:
Choice of law. In consolidated mass tort litigation instituted,
transferred, removed or maintained under this Act, the district court
shall determine the source or sources of applicable substantive law.
Whenever state law supplies the rule of decision, the court may make
its own determination in light of reason and experience as to which
State(s) rule(s) shall apply to some or all of the actions, parties or
issues.36
The Final Report concludes, that leaving development of the relevant
considerations concerning choice of law to the judges charged with administration
of the new statute on consolidation seems to be the most promising way of
providing the flexibility necessary to promote the success of the consolidation
regimen for the resolution of mass tort cases. 37 This choice of law decision of
the ABA Special Commission is another indication of the significant power and
authority which will be in the hands of the transferee court.
The Final Report further addresses the troublesome issue of choice of law as
follows:
[W]e prefer to meet the issue head-on and propose federal choice of law
legislation bottomed on Congress' authority to regulate interstate
commerce. Almost by definition, mass tort litigation of the kind
prompting our study involves interstate commerce both in the sense that
the cases arise from activity pursued in or affecting commerce and in
the perhaps separate sense that individual cases are brought in a number
of different states. We have struggled to develop a bright line that
separates state law selected under federal standards from federal law
itself. Some commissioners are persuaded that the line can be drawn;
others believe that the distinction approaches the chimerical. In any
event, the Commission concludes that a narrowly circumscribed statute
requiring federal courts to develop principles whereby state law-and
only state law-will be selected and applied in mass tort litigation is
consistent with traditional concerns of the American Bar Association
and others that tort law remain a matter primarily for state courts and
38
legislatures.
But it seems clear that even the "modified" approach adopted by the ABA
Special Commission in its Final Report means that litigants who started off in state

36. Id. at 4d.
37. Id. at 43-44.
38. Id. at 43.
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A anticipating perhaps that the law of state A would apply, may find themselves
in consolidated, mass tort litigation pending in a transferee federal court, and
anticipating that "the court-may make its own determination ... as to which
State(s) rule(s) shall apply. 39 The application of choice of law rules reflects
another area in which individual litigants will lose control over their individual
case.
D. The Power to Define the Scope of
ConsolidatedMass Tort Cases or to
"Deconsolidate"the Litigation
The true case management dimensions of the consolidation procedure
contemplated by the Final Report are revealed in the its discussions of the powers
of the transferee court to handle and manage the consolidated litigation. In this
regard, the Final Report states:
The judicial panel's decision to transfer individual tort cases to a single
judge will necessarily be made at relatiely early stages of the litigation
and without the discerning understanding of the cases which an
experienced trial judge will develop as the litigation unfolds. It is
accordingly necessary and appropriate that the judge presiding over
mass tort cases have broad authority to shape the course of the
developing litigation.4°
The Final Report concludes that in many cases it will be clear to the
transferee court that consolidated resolution of common issues is the proper case
management course of action.41 Presumably, in the case of a single-occurrence
mass tort, litigation of common questions may be reasonably anticipated pursuant
to the framework established by the Final Report. Similarly, it concludes that the
common question of whether a product was "defective" or whether an adequate
warning of potentially harmful effects was provided may, pursuant to a decision
42
of the transferee court, be suitable for consolidated resolution.
In the more probable situation, however, the transferee court's decisions
regarding consolidated versus individualized treatment of issues may not be so
easy:
There may be other cases, however, where what seemed to be a
question common to large numbers of plaintiffs turns out to be several
different questions. For example, what initially appeared to be a
straightforwardcase involving the toxicity of a product or the adequacy

39.
40.
41.
42.

Id. at 4d.
Id. at 59.
Id.
ld.
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of a warning may become complicated as different dosage levels or
different versions of the warning are identified. In such circumstances,
the court must be able to redefine the scope of the litigation to provide
for consolidated resolution of only certain issues or with respect to
particular parties.43
The significant role of the transferee court in determining how common
issues and individual issues will be decided, and in effect managing and shaping
the litigation, perhaps becomes even more pronounced in those mass tort
consolidations in which there are a number of individualized questions:
In still other cases, it may develop that individual questions so
overwhelm the common features of a case as to make consolidated
resolution inappropriate. This might be the case, for example, in certain
kinds of product liability litigation where the individual circumstances
of each plaintiff's use are found by the court to prevent the framing of
a factual question common to all or most of the cases. In yet other
cases, a court may properly determine that it is premature to proceed to
consolidated resolution of a common issue. For example, cases that test
the frontiers of scientific and medical knowledge may need some time
to mature, and in such a situation it may be preferable to defer efforts
at consolidated resolution to await the results of several individual cases
during which the scientific evidence may be developed and evaluated.44
The more the Final Report begins to explore the full range of the case
management powers of the transferee court, the more clearly the full measure of
consolidation may be defined. As the Final Report discusses various mixtures of
common issues and individual issues, it becomes abundantly clear that litigants in
individual cases are sacrificing their rights to litigate in an individualized,
independent manner pursuant to set rules and procedures, in deference to
consolidated resolution of the claims pursuant to procedures that are left largely
to the discretion of one transferee judge. Will plaintiffs who have only one day
in court for one claim find this case management discretion satisfactory? Will
defendants who are faced with "bet-your-company" consolidated litigation find the
virtually unlimited discretion accorded a transferee judge to be a sufficient
procedural protection?
In the name of case management and judicial efficiency, the Final Report
clearly takes significant steps towards eliminating the individual rights of litigants
to handle and process their individual claims.

43. Id. at 59-60 (emphasis added).
44. Id. at 60.
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E. Bifurcation of Issues
While it is "the common issues that bring individual cases together as mass
tort litigation ... [t]he Commission expects and indeed encourages courts
presiding over consolidated mass tort litigation to separate some or all parties,
claims or issues as the circumstances of the case may require."4 s Such "bifurcated" issues would not only include questions surrounding punitive damages
(discussed previously), but could also include questions that "arise in certain kinds
of toxic tort litigation" on "the issue of 'general causation.'" The Final Report
explains:
Because a dispute over 'general causation' can assume central
importance in particular litigation, it is understandable that some suggest
that the issue is properly isolated for resolution at a separate trial. In
some cases, this will be appropriate and will facilitate fair and expeditious resolution of the controversy

....

Courts are, we think, quite

properly sensitive to the potential for unfairness in such circumstances,
and we are accordingly content to leave to the trial judge in the context
of a particular case determination of whether a separate trial of a
general cause issue will promote the just resolution of the controver47
sy.
Once again, the case management authority of the transferee court is
highlighted by a recitation of the powers accorded the trial judge-this time in the
area of bifurcation.
F. Settlement
The Final Report states that "[t]he opportunity to settle some or all claims is
both a benefit and goal of consolidated treatment of mass tort cases."'' Nevertheless, the Final Report concedes that where common issues central to large
numbers of tort claims are at issue, unwilling parties should not be forced to deter
their rights to trial in order to pursue such procedures.49 Accordingly, the Final
Report recommendations call for employment of such techniques in common
issues raised in consolidated mass tort litigation only with the consent of all
parties.50

45. Id.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.

Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id.
Id. at

61.
61-62.
68.
61.
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G. Discussion of the Impact of Consolidated
Case Management Upon Individualized
Case Handling
The consolidation of cases is the major feature of the Final Report. The
negative implications for individual case management flowing from consolidation
of pretrial proceedings, motion practice, and adjudication of "common issues of
law and fact" are numerous. One of the central goals of consolidation -- the foreclosing of relitigation of the same or similar issues -- is directly contrary to
individualized case handling and management, where litigation of the same or
similar issues in each jurisdiction is necessary in order to obtain the most
favorable pretrial and trial rulings under each jurisdiction's law and procedures.
Under the Final Report, it is possible that there could be a single period of
discovery, with all discovery issues resolved by a single judge, and with all
discovery materials shared among the various plaintiffs who are parties to the
consolidated litigation. Likewise, there could be a single determination of
common issues and perhaps little hope of successfully rearguing the issues
elsewhere following the court's determination. "Common questions of law and
fact" that could be resolved in one mass tort proceeding could include general
causation.
Only "truly" individual issues in mass tort cases would be subject to
individual determination. For example, there might exist certain kinds of products
liability litigation where the individual circumstances of each plaintiff's use are
found to prevent the framing of a factual question common to all or most of the
cases. In such litigation, however, the consolidated trial of common issues would
be completely divorced from the individual issues. Common issues would be the
focus of the consolidated trial, with those issues in all likelihood resolved for
future litigation as well. However, when a common issue such as general
causation is tried in a consolidated vacuum, divorced from the individual issues,
there is always a risk that "the trial will become a sterile, scientific inquiry
divorced from the circumstances and people that give rise to the underlying tort
claims.""1
The answer to substantive state law questions such as the applicability of
"pure" comparative fault, might be determined by the transferee court only once.
The transferee court could select the state(s)'s law(s) that will govern resolution
of claims and defenses, with the court choosing such laws in light of reason and
experience. Because the Final Report does not include a specific statutory choiceof-law provision, as noted above, the transferee federal courts are encouraged to
develop their own.
The Final Report illustrates the operation of the proposed choice-of-law
provision with a discussion of a hypothetical, consolidated DES action. 2 The

51. Id.
52. Id. at 38-42.
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Final Report assumes that some plaintiffs could not survive a summary judgment
motion based on their failure to identify the manufacturer of the product and that
other plaintiffs could not survive a summary judgment motion based on the statute
of limitations, depending upon which "state(s)'s" substantive laws are selected to
govern the disposition of these issues. 53 The Commissioners observe that "the
outcome... may vary solely because consolidation has occurred before a federal
court pursuant to a statute designed to achieve an efficient and expeditious
resolution of a multistate controversy. Sometimes plaintiffs will benefit; on other
occasions defendants will be advantaged."4 As various courts work through
consolidated mass tort cases, it is hard to deny that something that looks very
much like federal tort law may emerge, particularly where federal judges often
find themselves on the forefront of new and novel tort law theories not fully sifted
by state courts. Thus, the judge before whom the litigation is consolidated may
be able to pick and choose ("limited," in theory, by evolving federal choice-of-law
standards) whether, for example, the design defect issue in the consolidated cases
should be resolved on the basis of a generic risk-utility test or a consumerexpectations test. One can foresee a transferee judge applying California law on
one issue in the case and Texas law on another.
Another recommendation in the Final Report that is of particular relevance
to the question of individualized case handling is that the court before which the
mass tort litigation is pending will be empowered to appoint a panel of two or
more "impartial experts" where there are "issues of fact requiring resolution by
expert testimony ... involving application of scientific, technical, medical or
otherwise complex principles."55 This panel is to be advised by the court in
writing of issues to be addressed by it; the panel's findings, together with
concurring or dissenting findings, may be "disclosed to the trier of fact at any
trial." 6 The parties are entitled to full discovery of the members of the panel.
Deposition and trial testimony of individual panel members would be admissible
to the extent otherwise permitted by the Federal Rules of Evidence. 7
The Panel-of-Experts procedure is calculated to increase the use of the
current procedure for court-appointed independent experts on scientific and
medical issues. Courts have been reluctant to take advantage of court-appointed
experts, in part because of the legitimate concern that such experts' testimony
would be given undue weight by the jury, since it would bear the court's
imprimatur. This risk would be greatly magnified by the appointment of an expert
panel in consolidated litigation, because the jury would be presented with a courtsanctioned "group expert opinion." The implications for individualized case
management of the panel-of-expert authority in the hands of a federal transferee
judge appear quite significant.

53.
54.
55.
56.
57.

Id. at 41-42.
Id. at 42 (emphasis added).
Id. at 63-64, 69-70, 5d.
Id.
Id.
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In addition to the foregoing, it is possible that the proposed statute contained
in the Final Report of the ABA Special Commission may actually provide an
incentive to increased and expanded litigation. The orientation of the Final Report
is toward the filing of lawsuits, and not toward "mass tort" cases in which
plaintiffs have had some success.58
As suggested above, there are also legitimate concerns regarding the
orientation of the Final Report toward settlement objectives. The Final Report
may envision a practical scenario in which several cases would be tried to
establish settlement "parameters," and subsequently the federal judge in charge of
the consolidated cases would try to point the subsequent parties toward settlements
based on those parameters. Clearly, any such orientation, expressed or implied,
could be contrary to the general litigation interests of those interested in individual
case management.
In conclusion, proposals such as the Final Report of the ABA Special
Commission may, as a practical matter, place too much "case management"
authority in the hands of one transferee judge. The transferee judge will be able
to "select" law and handle cases in a quasi-legislative manner. The judge will
presumably be able to select law which he deems to be most applicable and
desirable in each circumstance. In addition, the judge will have tremendous
powers to streamline discovery and otherwise control the litigation. The judge can
(i) appoint panels of experts, (ii) determine which issues will be tried as common
issues, (iii) establish mandatory ADR procedures for individual issues, and (iv)
otherwise structure the handling of the litigation to facilitate disposition. Such
case management power in the hands of one transferee judge could adversely
impact the overall fairness accorded individual litigants. As more case management authority is committed to the discretion and judgment of one transferee
judge, the less any one litigant can rely upon fixed rules and procedures and the
due process which such rules and procedures confirm and provide.
H. Mandatory ADR on Individual Issues
As indicated by the foregoing, the Final Report of the ABA Commission on
Mass Torts contemplates significant consolidated power in the hands of the
transferee judge. In this regard, the Final Report clearly contemplates use of that
transferee, consolidated power to force mandatory, court-annexed ADR procedures
upon the parties to resolve at least individual issues. Specifically, the Final Report
provides as follows regarding ADR:

58. Unlike the Report and Recommendations of the ABA Commission, the actual federal
legislation proposed in the Final Report does not contain any specific definition of mass torts. This
area of uncertainty may be a concern.
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Recommendation 9.
(a). A court should be empowered to require parties to
consolidated mass tort litigation to engage in alternative
dispute resolution procedures on any individual issue providing, however, that the right to trial by jury shall not thereby
be denied or impaired.
(b). With the consent of all parties, the court may employ
alternative dispute resolution procedures on common issues
raised in the litigation.
Commission Commentary:
These recommendations reflect our conclusion that a court
presiding over consolidated mass tort litigation should have
broad discretionary authority to provide for the efficient and
fair conduct of the litigation.

Provided that the right to trial by jury is not thereby impaired, Recommendation 9 contemplates legislation to
empower the court to require exhaustion of litigation alternatives before a case proceeds to trial solely on an individual
issues.5 9
In addition to the recommendation, the Final Report also contains a proposed
federal statute which includes a provision for alternative dispute resolution:
Section 109. Alternative Dispute Resolution.
(a). In any action maintained under this subchapter where there
a determination by the court to retain any action for adjudicabeen
has
tion of some or all issues, the court may, upon a finding that the just,
speedy and inexpensive disposition of the action will thereby be
advanced, require some or all of the parties to engage in alternative
dispute resolution procedures on any individual issues remaining for
resolution including, without limitation, mediation, third-party evaluation, non-binding arbitration, non-binding summary jury trial or minitrial. Nothing in this section shall be construed to impair a party's right
to trial by jury in the event that alternative dispute resolution procedures
directed by the Court do not result in settlement.

59. Final Report, supra note 9, at 70 (emphasis in original).
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(b). With the consent of all parties, the court may permit some or
all parties to engage in alternative dispute resolution procedures on
common issues. 60
The recommendations contained in the Final Report concerning alternative
dispute resolution must be read in the context of the overall recommendations
concerning consolidation of multicase, multiforum litigation. If cases are
consolidated pursuant to legislation enacted as a result of the recommendations
contained in the Final Report of the ABA Special Commission, the transferee
judge will be in a position to impose alternative dispute resolution on the parties,
at least as to "individual issues" and their cases. Voluntary ADR procedures may
be applied to common issues. As will be recalled, the court will determine the
nature and identity of common and individual issues.
The recommendations of the Final Report regarding ADR clearly contemplate
that a court would be empowered to require parties to consolidated mass tort
litigation to engage in alternative dispute resolution procedures on individual
issues. Thus, not only would parties lose an element of individual control of their
litigation, but the forced imposition of alternative dispute resolution methods may
place the parties one or more steps even farther removed from a jury trial on the
individual claims in their individual case. As thus contemplated, the alternative
dispute resolution referenced in the Final Report of the ABA Special Commission
may be thought to be more of a system of case management than a system of
voluntary, alternative methods for resolving disputes. The clear thrust of the
various proposals is a preference toward consolidated, judicially-oriented case
management over the individual rights of litigants to handle their litigation and to
pursue alternative methods of voluntary dispute resolution, when and if they so
desire.
III. THE AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE
COMPLEX LITIGATION PROJECT
The American Law Institute is in the process of drafting a series of proposed
federal statutes that, if enacted, would permit and facilitate the consolidation of
"related litigation" in a method similar to that proposed by the ABA Commission
on Mass Torts. Although work has been underway on the Complex Litigation
Project for some time, final documents may not be approved by the ALl until as
late as 1992. The subgroup of the AL that is charged with developing these draft
statutes is the "Complex Litigation Project." As of April 6, 1990, the Complex
Litigation Project has produced Tentative Draft No. 2 of (1) a Revised Statute for
Federal Intrasystem Consolidation, and (2) a Federal-State Intersystem Consolida-

60. Id. at 5d-6d.
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tion Statute for Federal-State Intersystem Consolidation. 61 Each statute is
accompanied by supporting and explanatory commentary. The statutes contained
in the Complex Litigation Draft provide a jurisdictional and procedural framework
for the consolidation of certain classes of tort cases and other claims (referred to
by the Reporters as "multi-party, multi-forum litigation"). Additional materials
were issued by the Complex Litigation Project to address the questions of
consolidation in state courts and choice of law on September 19, 1990.62
The Complex Litigation Project addresses consolidation and case management
of multicase and multiforum complex litigation. Although the Complex Litigation
Project does not specifically address ADR, as does the Final Report of the ABA
Special Commission, mandatory ADR is merely one step removed from the case
consolidation and transferee court case management contemplated by the ALl
Complex Litigation Project.
The following sections briefly discuss the ALI's two draft statutes as set forth
in the AL Complex Litigation Project Tentative Draft No. 2 of April 6, 1990.
A. Revised Complex Litigation Statute for
FederalIntrasystem Consolidation
The AL proposal provides that 28 U.S.C. Section 1407 (concerning multidistrict litigation) is to be repealed and the following types of provisions are to be
substituted. A Complex Litigation Panel of nine federal circuit and district judges
is to be established and given responsibility for deciding "whether and where
separate actions shall be transferred and consolidated" under the proposed
statute.63
The Complex Litigation Panel is empowered to transfer "civil actions pending
in more than one district [that] involve one or more common questions of fact or
64
law ... to any district for consolidated pretrial proceedings or trial, or both."
These transfers shall be made upon determination that the transfer and consolidation in the designated transferee court "will promote the fair, just, and efficient
conduct of the actions."o The Complex Litigation Panel is directed to consider
the following factors in deciding whether to order transfer and consolidation: (1)
the extent to which transfer and consolidation will reduce duplicative litigation, the

61. The American Law Institute, Complex Litigation Project, Tentative Draft No. 2, April'6, 1990
[hereinafter Complex Litigation Draft]. For those who may be interested, the AU offices may be
contacted via the Executive Office, The American Law Institute, 4025 Chestnut Street, Philadelphia,
Pennsylvania 19104. Arthur R. Miller, Harvard University Law School, is the Al Reporter for the
Complex Litigation Project; Mary Kay Kane, University of California, Hastings College of Law, is the
Associate ALT Reporter.
62. The American Law Insiitute, Complex Litigation Project, Reporter's Preliminary Draft No. 3,
September 19, 1990 (Chapter 4, Consolidation in State Courts; Chapter 6, Choice of Law) [hereinafter
Preliminary Draft No. 3].
63. Complex litigation Draft, supra note 61, at 1.
64. Id. at 2.
65. Id.
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relative costs of individual and consolidated litigation, the likelihood of inconsistent adjudications, and the comparative burdens on the judiciary; and (2) whether
transfer and consolidation can be accomplished in a way that is fair and does not
result in undue inconvenience to the parties and witnesses.6
"In special
circumstances, one or more common issues, rather than entire cases, may be
transferred and consolidated." In addition, more than one district court may be
designated as a transferee court. 7
The Complex Litigation Panel is required to designate individual judges to
conduct the consolidated proceedings.6 Because the Complex Litigation Draft
contemplates that a judge or judges may be designated and assigned temporarily
for service in the transferee district, the judges clearly do not need to be from the
district where the proceedings are consolidated. 69
Proceedings for the transfer of actions under the ALI's proposed statute may
be initiated by the Complex Litigation Panel on its own motion, on the suggestion
of the court before which any such action is pending, or on the motion of a party
in any such action filed with the Complex Litigation Panel.7" The Complex
Litigation Panel must give notice to all parties in all actions for which transfer is
being considered, specifying the time and place of the hearing to determine
whether transfer and consolidation shall be ordered. 7' Any party to an action
pending in any district that would be affected by the proceedings may furnish
material information to the Complex Litigation Panel hearing concerning the
hardship or inconvenience of consolidation.72 Parties are permitted "to show
cause" why a particular action or claim should be excluded from transfer even if
the Complex Litigation Panel determines that the group of related actions should
be transferred.73
Although orders granting a motion to transfer and consolidate shall include
a statement of the reasons for the decision, such orders cannot be appealed or
reviewed except by extraordinary writ pursuant to 28 U.S.C. section 1651. 7 ' The
proposal provides, "there shall be no review by appeal or otherwise of an
order
75
of the Panel denying a motion to transfer for consolidated proceedings."
The ALI's proposed statute contemplates that the transferee court has full
power to "organize and manage the consolidated proceeding." 76 The transferee
court may, for example, organize the parties into groups with like interests,
separate issues into those common questions that should be treated on a

66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.

Id. at
Id.
Id. at
Id.
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at

3.
7.
7-8.
8.
8-10.
8-9.
11-12.
12.
13.
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consolidated basis, identify individual issues that do not require common
treatment, certify classes encompassing the litigation as a whole or particular
issues, and stay discovery and trial preparation on issues not consolidated until the
close of the consolidated proceeding.77 The court may also sever issues or
claims and transfer such issues or claims for separate or consolidated treatment in
one or more "retransferee districts."78
In consolidated actions, the transferee court shall determine "the source or
sources of the applicable substantive law."79 Whenever state law supplies the
rule of decision, the transferee court shall "make its own determination as to which
state's rule(s) of decision shall apply to some or all of the actions, parties, or
issues. " '
Of potential relevance to possible imposition of mandatory ADR by the
transferee court, the ALI's proposed statute provides:
(d)

As soon as practicable after transfer and consolidation have been
effected, the transferee court shall prepare a preliminary plan and
order for the management and disposition of the litigation,
specifying whether the transferee court will determine the entire

77. Id.
78. Id. at 14-15.
79. Id. at 17.
80. Id. Preliminary Draft No. 3, supra note 62, sets forth the following choice of law provisions
for state created actions:
§ 6.01. Mass Torts
(a) In actions consolidated under § 3.01, the transferee court shall determine the
law governing the rights, liabilities, and defenses of the parties with respect to an issue
in tort by considering the factors listed in subsection (b) with the objective of applying
a single state's law to all the claims being asserted against each defendant.
(b) The factors to be considered in determining the law under subsection (a) are:
(1) the place of injury;
(2) the place where the conduct causing the injury occurred;
(3) the principal place of business of the defendants; and
(4) the domicile of the plaintiffs.
(c) If,in evaluating the factors listed in subsection (b), the court finds that the
place of injury and the place where the conduct causing the injury occurred are in the
same state, that state's laws should control. If those factors are not in the same state, but
the plaintiffs are domiciled in the same state as the state where a defendant has its
principal place of business or the plaintiffs are domiciled in the same state as the place
of injury, then that state's law should control. In all other cases, the state where the
conduct causing the injury occurred should provide the governing law.
(d) In applying the rules in subsection (c), the transferee court shall assess whether
the results obtained will be fair and will allow for the consolidated treatment of the claims
before it. In appropriate cases, the court may determine that the actions should be divided
into subgroups of claims or parties so as to allow more than one state's law to be applied.
The court also may determine that only some of the claims involving some of the parties
should be governed by the law chosen upon the application of the rules in subsection (c),
and that other claims or parties should be remanded to the transferor courts for individual
treatment there. If so, the court may exercise its authority under § 3.06(c) to sever,
retransfer, or remand issues or claims for treatment consistent with its determination.
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action or only specified issues and providing for the disposition of
issues that it will not determine."'

The transferee court's decision to retransfer claims or issues may be reviewed
only by the Complex Litigation Panel.82 This review is discretionary; any party
to a retransfer decision may petition the Complex Litigation Panel for its
review."
The proposed ALl statute contemplates that 28 U.S.C. section 1292 is to be
amended to add a provision permitting immediate appellate review of a liability
determination by a transferee court as to "all the claims and parties."" Review
of that determination may be sought as a final judgment under 28 U.S.C. section
1291 within thirty (30) days of the trial court's order. If a liability determination
has been made as to less than all the claims or parties, the transferee court may
certify that determination for interlocutory appellate review "if it concludes that
there is no just reason for delay."85 All appeals of consolidated actions (except
those consolidated for pretrial purposes only) shall be heard in the court of appeals
of the circuit in which the transferee court, as designated by the Complex
Litigation Panel, is located. 6
The transferee court is given personal jurisdiction in consolidated actions over
any party "to the full extent 8of the power conferable on a federal court under the
United States Constitution." 1
Trial and hearing subpoenas may be served at any place within the
jurisdiction of the United States, "or anywhere outside the United States if not
otherwise prohibited by law."88
B. Complex Litigation Statute for
89
Federal-StateIntersystem Consolidation
The preceding discussion of the Federal Intrasystem Oonsolidation involves
only the federal courts. However, the AL Complex Litigation Project maintains
that the problems posed by multiparty, multiforum litigation cannot adequately be
addressed without also considering whether related cases that are filed in both
federal and state courts also should be subject to some consolidation mechanism.
For the ALI, the answer is yes.

81. Complex Litigation Draft, supra note 61, at 19.
82. Id. at 19-20.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 21-22.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 23.
87. Id. at 24.
88. Id. at 25.
89. The proposed federal-state intersystem consolidation statute assumes that the statute for federal
intrasystem consolidation has been enacted and "builds upon [it]."
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To fill this perceived consolidation need, the ALl proposes its Intersystem
Consolidation which supports consolidation through expanded removal as well as
through mandatory or coerced consolidation.
The ALI's proposed federal-state consolidation statute provides that:
[T]he Complex Litigation Panel may order the removal to federal court
and consolidation of one or more civil actions pending in one or more
state courts, if the removed actions arise from the same transaction,
occurrence, or series of transactions or occurrences as an action already
filed in the federal court, and share a common question of law or fact
with that action. 90
Removal may be initiated upon either the request of any party to one of the state
actions or by the certification of any state judge presiding over one or more of the
actions. The Panel is directed to consider whether removal and consolidation is
warranted and to ensure that removal would not "unduly disrupt or impinge upon
state court proceedings or impose an undue burden on federal courts," in addition
to considering the other "consolidation factors" enumerated in the Federal
Intrasystem Consolidation Statute. 91 If the Complex Litigation Panel determines
to remove a given class of cases, any case where all parties and the presiding state
judge object to its removal may be remanded. 92
A transferee district court shall have subject matter jurisdiction over any
claim that (1) arises from the same transaction [or is removed pursuant
to the above provision] as a claim that has been transferred to it
pursuant to Section 3.01 of the Intrasystem Consolidation Statute or (2)
involves indemnification arising from the same transaction, occurrence
or series of related transactions or occurrences as a claim that has been

90. Complex Litigation Draft, supra note 61, at 33. The Complex Litigation Project's draft of this
statute appeared most recently in The American Law Institute, Complex Litigation Project, Preliminary
Draft No. 2, September 13, 1989 [hereinafter Preliminary Draft No. 2]; The American Law Institute,
Complex Litigation Project, Council Draft No. 2, November 14, 1989 [hereinafter Council Draft No.

2].
91. Complex litigation Draft, supra note 61, at 33.
92. Id. at 33-34. Preliminary Draft No. 2 included a proposal that district courts have original
jurisdiction of civil actions arising out of the same transaction, occurrence, or series of related
transactions or occurrences, if (1) "the matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value of $25,000 for
each of any 25 actual or prospective plaintiffs" and if at least one of the actions may be filed or has
been filed in a court of a state other than that of any other action, or (2) the matter in controversy
exceeds the sum of $5,000 for any five actual or prospective plaintiffs and all the defendants cannot
be joined in the courts of any one state or in the courts of a state in which a substantial part of the acts
or omissions giving rise to the action occurred or a substantial part of the actions or omissions giving
rise to the action occurred in two or more states. Such an action may be brought only if a party is a
citizen of a state and any actual or prospective adverse party is a citizen of another state or of a foreign
state. Preliminary Draft No. 2, supra note 90. This proposal was apparently rejected by the Project
Advisory Committee.
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transferred to it pursuant to Section 3.01 [of the proposed Intrasystem
Consolidation Statute].93
This jurisdiction exists without regard to whether the ancillary or pendent claim
involves the addition of a party who is not a party to the jurisdictionally sufficient
claims to which it is joined. The court's exercise of this jurisdiction is discretionary.
Personal jurisdiction may be asserted over any party to a consolidated action
by the district court to which an action is transferred for consolidated treatment
(after removal) "to the full extent of the power conferrable on a federal court
under the United States Constitution."'94
In actions removed under this Section, the ALI's proposed new 28 U.S.C.
section 2120 would provide that "[t]he federal court shall determine the source or
sources of applicable substantive law" and "the court may make its own
determination as to which State's rule(s) of decision shall apply to some or all of
the actions, parties, or issues."95
Various time limits are established for the filing of removal petitions in
multiparty, multiforum cases. No time limit is imposed when removal is initiated
by certification of a state trial judge.'
The transferee court may enjoin related proceedings pending in any state or
United States court whenever "it determines that the continuation of those actions
substantially impairs or interferes with the consolidated actions and that an
injunction would promote the just and efficient resolution of the actions."' This
grant of authority is discretionary. The transferee court should consider in
determining whether to enjoin pending related litigation (1) how far the actions to
be enjoined have progressed, (2) the degree to which the actions pending in the
other courts share common questions with and are duplicative of the consolidated
actions, (3) the extent to which the actions to be enjoined involve issues or claims
of federal law, and (4) whether parties to the action to be enjoined were permitted
to exclude themselves from the consolidated proceeding. 98
Under the ALI proposal, the transferee court has the power to require non
parties to intervene in the consolidated litigation or "be bound by the determinations made [therein] to the same extent as a party to that action" if (1) the claim
or claims of the nonparties involve one or more questions of law or fact in
common with the consolidated actions "and arise out of the same transaction,
occurrence, or series of transactions or occurrences;" (2) intervention will advance
the efficient, consistent, and final resolution of asserted and unasserted claims; and
(3) intervention will not impose upon either the non-parties or existing parties

93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.

Complex litigation Draft, supra note 61, at 76.
Id. at 138-39.
Id. at 139.
Id. at 62.
Id. at 83-86, 143-45.
Id. at 83-86.
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undue prejudice, burden, or inconvenience." The transferee court's decision to
require compulsory intervention "will not be subject to immediate review, unless
it otherwise qualifies for review under one of the interlocutory appeal statutes."1" The transferee court is required to provide the nonparties that it desires
to intervene with "clear and timely notice" of the proposed required intervention
and the fact that the nonparties will be bound by and precluded from relitigating
matters adjudicated in the action pending before the transferee court. Upon receipt
of this notice, any interested party or nonparty may file with the transferee court
a statement of reasons why intervention should not be ordered. l 1

C. PracticalConsiderationsRegarding
The ALl Complex Litigation Project
The ALI Complex Litigation Project represents another proposal for a
statutory scheme to consolidate "related litigation" which parallels the case
management proposal of the ABA Commission on Mass Torts and H.R. 3406, the
Amended Multiparty, Multiforum Jurisdiction Act of 1989.102
The bulk of the 152-page ALl Tentative Draft No. 2 on the proposed
Federal-State Intersystem Consolidation Statute is devoted to a detailed defense of
the proposed statute on constitutional and public policy grounds. This may be due
to the fact that the statute itself, in conjunction with the Federal Intrasystem
Consolidation Statute, provides the Complex Litigation Panel and the court to
which the consolidated litigation is transferred with a series of powerful procedural
tools calculated to serve the ultimate case management goals of the Complex
Litigation Project, namely, the fair and efficient resolution of entire controversies

99. Id. at 145.
100. Id. at 98.
101. Id. at 146. Preliminary Draft No. 2 also provided that where actions are being consolidated
from both state and federal courts, the Complex Litigation Panel could designate a state transferee
court. The state judge would become "federalized" and have the same powers and responsibilities of
a federal transferee court. In addition to the consolidation and transfer factors to be considered when
a federal court is the transferee court, when a state court is the proposed transferee court the Complex
Litigation Panel is directed to consider (1) the number of individual cases that were pending in state
courts relative to the number of actions pending in federal courts, (2) the number of states in which
the state and federal cases are located, (3) whether the law of a particular state is likely to govern the
litigation, and (4) any other factor indicating that a particular state or federal interest should be
accommodated in determining whether or not to transfer the consolidated cases to a state court.
Appeals from the state transferee court would be to the federal appeals court for the circuit in which
the transferee state court sits. The Complex Litigation Panel would be expanded to include nine state
court judges designated by the Chief Justice of the United States. The Complex litigation Panel would
be divided into two divisions. The first division, comprised of federal judges, is to handle the transfer
and consolidation decisions regarding cases filed in the federal courts only; the second panel,
comprised of both federal and state court judges, is to handle removal, transfer, and consolidation
decisions involving cases from both the federal and state court systems. Preliminary Draft No. 2, supra
note 90.
102. H.R. 3406, as currently drafted, is limited to personal injury (or property damage) arising out
of a single occurrence-accident.
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and the avoidance of redundant and duplicative litigation. 3 These procedural
tools include expansion of current federal multidistrict litigation consolidation to
include coordinated or consolidated trials as well as consolidated pretrial
proceedings, removal jurisdiction over state court actions involving common
questions of law or fact and arising out of the same transaction, occurrence or
series of related transactions or occurrences, power to enjoin parallel litigation, and
the power to compel the joinder of nonparties.
The ALI's proposed Federal Intrasystem Consolidation Statute, as its title
implies, is applicable only to cases filed in the federal courts that "involve one or
more common questions of fact or law.""° One principle departure of the
proposed Federal Intrasystem Consolidation Statute from 28 U.S.C. section 1407
is that the transferee court may conduct consolidated trials as well as pretrial
proceedings. The transferee court has full power to organize and manage the
consolidated proceeding. This power includes "the separation of issues into
common questions that require treatment on a consolidated basis and individual
questions that do not."' 0 5 The Reporters note, however, that in severing issues
"the court must ensure that severing issues does not impinge on the parties' jury
trial rights."'"
Liability and damages issues, for example, are thought to be
sufficiently "distinct and independent" so as to satisfy the limitation of the Seventh
Amendment. 1" The severed issues may be tried before the consolidation court,
or the court may retransfer the severed issues to another court (for example, where
the case originated).
The transferee court is also empowered to "determine the source or sources
of the ... substantive law" applicable to consolidated cases. In a diversity case,
the transferee court "may make its own determination as to which State's rule(s)
of decision shall apply to some or all of the actions, parties, or issues."' °8
As the draft Federal Intrasystem Consolidation Statute stands, it would apply
to many types of litigation in federal courts, including products liability cases.
The only "numerosity" requirement is that there be civil actions pending in "more
than one [federal] district"; the only "relatedness" requirement is that "one or
more" actions "involve one or more common questions of law or fact."'0 9 As
with the ABA Final Report, the consolidation for trialon "common" issues is also
a centerpiece of the Complex Litigation Project. Common issues would be tried
in the abstract, divorced from the individual issues of any case or claimant. As

103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.

Complex Litigation Draft, supra note 61, at 2-3, 34-37.
Id. at 2-3.
Id. at 13.
Id. at 14.
Id.
Id. at 17.
Id. at 2-3.
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is the case with the ABA proposal, this is an unfavorable posture for the independent, individualized handling and trial of cases." 0
Moreover, as noted above, the Federal Intrasystem Consolidation Statute
authorizes the transferee judge to select the state law that will govern liability (and
other) determinations without reference to state choice-of-law principles. As with
the ABA proposal, this provision creates the very real possibility that the
substantive law for a particular case could be selected by a judge from the law of
a jurisdiction lacking even minimum contacts with the parties or claims. New or
novel theories of liability and recovery might also be imposed, if embraced by the
transferee judge.
The statute and its comments contemplate a coordinated period of discovery,
with the transferee judge managing the cases in an active, quasi-legislative manner.
Discovery againstthe defendants may be expected to be expedited and controlled
under the polestar of efficient judicial management. Conversely, defendants'
discovery, much of which could be limited to "individual" issues, may well prove
to be truncated and closely monitored, or deferred until the "common" liability
issues have been resolved. In any case, the control over discovery represents
significant case management opportunity for the transferee judge.
The case management aspects of the draft statute for Federal Intrasystem
Consolidation are reinforced and magnified by the draft statute for Federal-State
Intersystem Consolidation.' As noted above, much of the Reporters' commentary is devoted to a detailed discussion of the constitutional underpinnings of the
expanded notions of federal jurisdiction. This jurisdiction can be invoked where
"one or more civil actions" are filed in state court sharing common questions of
law or fact and arising from the same transaction or occurrence (or series of2
transactions or occurrences) with "an action already filed in the federal court.""11
The ALI Reporters-note that the transaction standard delimits groups of cases that
have a sufficient relationship so that centralizing control over them should foster

110. As in the Final Report, supra note 9, the Complex Litigation Panel's decision to consolidate
cases is discretionary. The Complex litigation Panel's exercise of discretion is to be informed by a
number of factors, including whether consolidation can be accomplished in a way that is fair to the

parties. Thus, individual litigants could try to argue that their cases are uniquely unsuited for
consolidation because the individual issues predominate over the common questions. A similar
argument has been made in the context of class certification in the asbestos cases, see Yandle v. PPG
Industries, Inc., 65 F.R.D. 566 (E.D. Tex. 1974), and the DES cases, see McElhaney v. Eli Lilly & Co.,
93 F.R.D. 875 (D.S.D. 1982), with mixed results.
111. The ALl Reporters have withdrawn their proposed grant of original federal question subject
matter jurisdiction over multiparty, multiforum cases. The Al Reporters note that their initial
approach "appears [to be] a more efficient means of achieving [consolidation]." Complex Litigation
Draft, supra note 61, at 37. Their more cautious choice of removal jurisdiction, however, will "allow
the [Complex litigation Panel] to gain experience regarding how consolidated cases best can be
handled and what cases should be suitable for such treatment, and should allow for closer scrutiny, as
well as the development of uniform standards for identifying what cases should be treated in this
may be that ...
fashion." Id. at 37-38. "[W]ith more experience," the AL Reporters suggest, "[i]t
original jurisdiction also should be conferred on the federal courts." Id. at 38.

112. Id. at 33.
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their efficient and economical adjudication. This low "numerosity requirement,"
if two cases can be called such, would be met in numerous circumstances.
Moreover, the low threshold number and the absence of any limitation to mass tort
cases could make the proposed ALl statute, if adopted, a much greater expansion
of federal court jurisdiction than the ABA Mass Torts proposal." 3
More importantly, the Complex Litigation Panel would have the authority to
remove all "transactionally related" cases filed in state courts on the motion of any
party or upon the state judge's certification to one such case." 4 This grant of
authority goes beyond the removal provision of the ABA Mass Tort Proposal,
which permits removal of a given case (and transfer to the consolidated
proceedings) on the motion of a party to that case. The ALI Reporters describe
the combined effect of the removal and consolidation features as follows:
In most cases, removal and consolidation of transactionally related
claims sharing common questions of law or fact will promote judicial
efficiency because the litigants will need to prepare for one trial,
conduct discovery only once, and will be able to share discovery
expenses. Consolidation also may benefit the participants by reducing
the risk of multiple and overlapping punitive damage awards, the rigors
of the "divide and conquer" strategy of many institutional defendants,
and the possibility of inconsistent results."'
Two additional features of the Federal-State Intersystem Consolidation Statute
should be discussed further. The first is the express grant of authority to the
transferee court to "enjoin related proceedings, or portions thereof, pending in any
State or United States court whenever it determines that the continuation of those
actions substantially impairs or interferes with the consolidated actions and that an
injunction would promote the just and efficient resolution of the actions before
it."" 6 This authority does not exist in the current draft of the ABA proposal.
The ALI Reporters note that the consolidation court "cannot depend entirely on
the fortuity of all parties being willing to join in the [consolidated] action" in order
to achieve the "efficiency and fairness" of the Complex Litigation Project." 7
Thus, the ALI perceives that it is necessary to provide for situations in which

113. As presented at the August 1989 ABA Annual Meeting, the ABA proposal's consolidation
feature would be triggered by "atleast 100 civil tort actions arising from a single accident or use of
or exposure to the same product or substance, each of which involves a claim in excess of $50,000 for
wrongful death, personal injury or physical damage to or destruction of tangible property .... " Final
Report, supra note 9, at 2d.
114. Complex Litigation Project, supra note 61, at 61-62. The ALI's proposed statute "authorizes
removal to be initiated upon the request of any party to a state action, or upon certification by a state
court judge before whom one of the actions is pending." Id. at 57.
115. Id. at 35.
116. Id. at 83.
117. Id. at 84.
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parties refuse to cooperate and the result is duplicative litigation that interferes
with the transferee courts' ability to manage the consolidated litigation." 8
The second feature worthy of further note is the transferee court's authority
to compel intervention by nonparties in the consolidated action. Again, this goes
beyond the ABA proposal which merely provides that a person who is "aware of"
a consolidated proceeding, and could have participated as a party in the proceeding
(but did not), may not "claim or derive any evidentiary or other benefit of a
' 9
judgment entered against a defendant ... in the consolidated adjudication." 1
The ALI's proposed Federal Intrasystem Consolidation Statute permits the
transferee court, again on its own initiative (or by motion of a party), to notify
nonparties with claims that involve one or more common questions of law or fact
with the consolidated action, that they must intervene in the consolidated action
or be "bound by the determinations made [therein] to the same extent as a party
to that action."' 20 This procedure is "limited to being used with reference to
existing claims and thus does not provide a mechanism for addressing the
problems of duplication or inconsistency that may occur when claims mature later
that involve adjudication of some of the same facts."''
The ALI Reporters conclude that this provision is necessary "because under
the present issue preclusion rules people allegedly injured . . . [in a complex
dispute] have an incentive to wait on the sidelines while litigation is pursued by
similarly situated plaintiffs." 22 The ALI Reporters note, however:
Absolute finality is not possible, of course. Intervention and preclusion
... necessarily are limited. This device cannot achieve the consolidation of claims of nonparties who are unknown to the court or of claims
that have not yet arisen. In these situations there is no way that
meaningful notice and opportunity to be heard can be provided under
this scheme. 23
Thus, the proposed ALI statute at least requires that all nonparties receive "clear
and timely notice" of the pending consolidated action before such non-parties will
be bound absent their intervention.
The combination of removal, antisuit injunctions, and compulsory intervention, the latter two of which may be initiated by the Complex Litigation Panel or

118. As first proposed, the action to be enjoined need not have 'substantially impair[ed] or
interfer[ed] with the consolidated actions." Preliminary Draft No. 2, supra note 90, at 102. The
additional requirement was added to underscore the exceptional circumstances necessary for such an
injunction to issue. The All Reporters suggest that "it would be very rare for a case to be enjoined
...that did not involve at least one of the parties litigating in the transferee court." Complex
Litigation Draft, supra note 61, at 85.
119. Final Report, supra note 9, at 7d.
120. Complex Litigation Draft, supra note 61, at 97.
121. Id. at 99.
122. Id.
123. Id. at 101.

https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/jdr/vol1990/iss2/3

28

Dreyer: Dryer: Litigation Management Proposals:
1990]

LITIGATION MANAGEMENT

the transferee court on its own motion, may vest the transferee courts under the
Complex Litigation Project proposal with even more authority than transferee
courts would have under the ABA Mass Torts proposal. Moreover, as noted
above, the absence of a numerical threshold for the grant of federal question or
removal jurisdiction, and the lack of limitation to tort cases, represents a broad
expansion of federal court jurisdiction beyond the mass tort contemplation of the
ABA proposal. The confluence of these powers in a transferee court may result
in heightened resistance to this proposal by all litigants, plaintiffs or defendants,
who still want individualized control of their litigation.
The ALI proposal clearly places significant power in the hands of the
transferee federal judge to control, organize, and manage the consolidated litigation
all the way through trial. The transferee court enjoys express authority to force
nonparties into the consolidated action through a variety of procedural means, or
suffer the result of being bound by its ultimate outcome.
The Complex Litigation Project's proposals do not include some of the other
features of the ABA Mass Torts proposal. For example, the ALI Project has not
yet addressed issues such as compulsory settlement negotiations or participation
in alternative dispute resolution procedures. Similarly, the Complex Litigation
Project has yet to create anything analogous to the ABA's proposed "panel of
experts" procedure. The work of the Complex Litigation Project, however, is
ongoing.
D. The Impact of the Complex Litigation Project on ADR
The central feature of the Complex Litigation Project is consolidation of
common issues in related cases. Consolidation of cases for the purposes of
discovery, pretrial motions, and adjudication of "common issues of law and fact,"
will remove these cases from individualized case management and preparation.
This core feature is shared with the ABA Mass Torts Proposal. The ALI proposal
goes beyond the ABA Mass Torts proposal, however, both in its contemplated
expansion of federal court jurisdiction and in its grant of authority to the transferee
court to manage the consolidated litigation.
Although the ALI Complex Litigation Project does not specifically address
mandatory, court-annexed ADR, there can be little doubt that mandatory ADR
would fall within the extensive powers which are contemplated for the transferee
court over the consolidated litigation.
In discussing the case management authority of the transferee court, the ALI
Reporters note as follows:
In order to allow for the most efficient handling of complex multi-party
actions, the transferee court must be given maximum flexibility to
design and structure the litigation in light of the particular issues and
parties involved. This section recognizes that it sets out various options
that may be used by the transferee court to accomplish the fair, just, and
economical resolution of the actions.
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1990
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As provided in this section, the only constraint on the transferee court's
discretion in structuring the litigation is that the approach taken should
foster the just, efficient, and fair resolution of the actions.

The timing for resolving retransferred or remanded issues or claims also
is within the transferee court's discretion. The purpose of this section
is to provide maximum flexibility to the transferee judge to manage the
litigation in a way that will be most efficient and fair.' 24
Given the express provisions of the ALI's proposed statutes on consolidation,
and given the intent expressed in the ALI Reporter's comments to the proposed
statutes, there can be little doubt that one of the primary goals behind the proposed
statute is to concentrate case management authority in the hands of the transferee
federal judge. Given this concentration of power there is no reason to expect that
the transferee judge would not have case management authority extending to the
imposition of mandatory alternative dispute resolution procedures. Thus, although
the Complex Litigation Proposal does not contain ADR provisions or requirements, it seems clear that the transferee judge will have sufficient case management authority to undertake mandatory ADR proceedings. For example, is there
any reason to believe that a transferee judge could not order court-annexed
arbitration, court-annexed mediation, summary jury trials, or submissions to a
"panel of neutrals" selected and appointed by the court?
Under the consolidation contemplated by the ALI's proposed statutes,
alternative dispute resolution would not be a voluntary procedure entered into
freely by the parties to try and resolve disputes. Rather, it is quite likely that
alternative dispute resolution under the ALI consolidation model will be a hybrid
form of mandatory case management procedure. It is reasonable to anticipate that
the consolidation statutes contemplated by the ALl will increase the use of and
recourse to mandatory alternative dispute resolution, and will, simultaneously,
decrease the use of availability and recourse to voluntary ADR worked out and
agreed to by the parties. In this context, if the transferee courts do engage in
mandatory ADR, it may be preferable to refer to such procedures as transferee
court case management procedures, and not to label them as alternative dispute
resolution methods. In the hands of a transferee judge in consolidated litigation,
the mandatory ADR procedures will acquire attributes of pretrial case management
proceedings, and will look less and less like traditional methods of voluntary
alternative dispute resolution.
Because the Complex Litigation Project is perhaps, at present, the most
comprehensive treatment of a proposed statute for multicase, multiforum

124. Id. at 14-15.
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consolidation, it deserves detailed examination. The implications of the Complex
Litigation Project for alternative dispute resolution should also be discussed. Even
though the ALI's proposed statutes do not reference ADR, the impact of the ALI
proposal on ADR should be evaluated because the ALI "consolidation model" may
become the federal law relating to multicase, multiforum consolidation. In that
event, the case management authority of the transferee court under the ALI's
proposed statutes will be important and relevant to a consideration of ADR in the
environment of multicase complex litigation. As noted above, the "weather
forecast" for the future of voluntary ADR under the consolidation litigation model
is "stormy" at best. While there is considerable movement in the bar and the legal
profession to try to incorporate voluntary dispute resolution methods in business
relationships, contracts, and in actual disputes, the AL consolidation model
focuses upon dispute resolution as a mandatory case management device.
Although much of the dialogue on alternative dispute resolution focuses upon
"voluntary cooperation," the ALI consolidation model suggests that the focus on
ADR will be on "mandatory participation," "judicial efficiency," "centralized
management," and procedurally "coerced" settlements. Is this the "weather
forecast" we are looking for?
IV. FEDERAL COURTS STUDY COMMITTEE
In November 1988, the 100th Congress created within the Judicial Conference of the United States a fifteen-member Federal Courts Study Committee.
They directed the Committee, by April 2, 1990, to make a complete study of the
courts of the United States and of several states and transmit a report on such a
study to the President, the Chief Justice of the United States, the Congress, the
Judicial Conference of the United States, the Conference of Chief Justices, and the
State Justice Institute.1 s
The statute specifically directs the Federal Courts Study Committee to
analyze alternative dispute resolution, and the types of disputes currently embraced
by federal jurisdiction. In December 1988, Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist
appointed the Federal Courts Study Committee members who were, in the words
of the statute, representative of the various interests, needs, and concerns which
may be affected by the jurisdiction of the federal courts.
Thus, as with other projects and proposals, the Federal Courts Study
Committee was to look at subjects such as consolidation of complex litigation and
alternative dispute resolution. Consolidated case management and mandatory
alternative dispute resolution were thus once again considered under the umbrella
of judicial efficiency.
On April 2, 1990, the Fedetal Courts Study Committee (the "Committee")
published its report containing recommendations concerning the structure and

125. Judicial Improvements and Access to Justice Act, Pub. L No. 100-702, 102 Stat. 4642
(1988).
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operation of the federal courts."2 Certain of these recommendations address
issues of potential concern to litigants in multicase civil litigation. These issues
include diversity jurisdiction, adjudication of complex litigation, and alternative
dispute resolution.
A. Diversity Jurisdiction
The basic recommendation of the Committee as to diversity jurisdiction is as
follows:
Congress should limit federal jurisdiction based on. diversity of
citizenship to complex multi-state litigation interpleader, and suits
involving aliens. At the least, it should effect changes to curtail the
most obvious problems of the current jurisdiction.

As currently codified in 28 U.S.C. § 1332, diversity jurisdiction
essentially authorizes federal courts to decide cases that do not involve
federal law if those cases are between citizens of different states or
between United States citizens and aliens, and the amount in controversy is over $50,000. Federal jurisdiction is not exclusive in such cases,
and federal courts apply state law.' 27
The Committee's reasons for seeking the virtual elimination of diversity
jurisdiction are as follows:
We believe that diversity jurisdiction should be virtually eliminated for
two simples reasons: On the one hand, no other class of cases has a
weaker claim on federal judicial resources. On the other hand, no other
step will do anywhere near as much to reduce federal caseload pressures
and contain the growth of the federal judiciary. Given all the demands
on the federal courts, there is little reason to use them for contract
disputes or automobile accident suits simply because the parties live
across state boundaries-especially when litigants who do not live in
different states must bring otherwise identical suits in state courts. 128

126. Report of the Federal Courts Study Committee (April 2, 1990) [hereinafter Federal Courts
Report].
127. Id. at 38-39.
128. Id. at 39.
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B. Complex Litigation
The recommendations regarding diversity jurisdiction must be considered,
however, in the context of the Committee's complex litigation recommendations.
The Committee broadly endorses some type of legislation to authorize the federal
courts to adjudicate multistate, multiforum "complex litigation."129 The Committee recognizes that current law permits consolidation of such cases in federal court
for pretrial purposes only. Although the Committee does not address a number
of difficult subsidiary issues, the Committee nevertheless concludes that something
must be done to economize the handling of such litigation. The Committee makes
no recommendation that federal substantive law standards be enacted to
accompany the suggested procedural reforms.
The primary Committee recommendation on complex litigation, along with
explanatory Committee comment provides as follows:
a.

Complex litigation

Complex, multi-party disputes often give rise to litigation in both state
and federal courts. The committee supports a statutory amendment, and
proposes two steps the courts should take, to facilitate the processing of
complex litigation in federal court.
(1) Congress should amend the multi-district litigation statute to permit
consolidated trials as well as pretrial proceedings and should create a
special federal diversity jurisdiction, based on the minimal diversity
authority conferred by Article III, to make possible the consolidation of
major multi-party, multi-forum litigation.
The past few decades have witnessed a considerable increase in
complex litigation in which litigants press related claims concurrently
in several federal and state courts. Airplane crash and product liability
cases are two examples. There is partial federal court authority to deal
with such cases, but it does not go far enough. For cases already in
federal court, 28 U.S.C. Section 1407(a) permits consolidated proceedings in cases involving common questions of fact-but only for pretrial
proceedings. As a practical matter, to be sure, cases often settle, or
liability questions are tried together by consent. Many parties to these
national cases, however, cannot have their state law claims tried in
federal court because they are citizens of the same state as one of their
adversaries and thus do not meet the long-standing requirement of
complete diversity among parties.

129. Id. at 44.
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We believe, though, that the federal trial forum should be available to
ensure the economy of one court's resolving disputes involving multiple
parties from many states. Thus we recommend that Congress broaden
§ 1407(a) to allow for consolidated trial as well as pretrial proceedings
and adopt a new jurisdiction based on minimal, rather than complete,
diversity so that parties to a multi-state, multi-party state law litigation
can be included even if they are citizens of the same state. This
jurisdiction would permit more efficient handling of cases that are
already partly before the federal courts, thus minimizing any workload
increase. (And any increase would be more than offset if Congress
eliminates most current diversity jurisdiction.)
We do not take up numerous difficult subsidiary issues in complex
litigation, such as choice of law, statutes of limitations, single-event or
related-matter jurisdiction, removal of possible revision of joinder and
class action rules, and remand for trial on damages. The American Law
Institute and the American Bar Association Commission on Mass Torts
have conducted major studies of these questions, and the House of
Representatives is considering legislation to create a special federal
jurisdiction for mass disasters.'
As can be seen from the foregoing, the Committee contemplates and
recommends federal legislation to enhance the ability of the federal courts to
consolidate in the name of judicial efficiency and economy. However, unlike the
Complex Litigation Project and the ABA Special Commission on Mass Torts, the
Committee does not even attempt to address a number of very basic and
troublesome issues such as choice of law. Once again, the overriding polestar
appears to be case management.
C. Megacase JudicialManagement
Many proponents of consolidation of complex litigation cite to multicase,
megalitigation such as the asbestos litigation as support for case management and
judicial intervention. However, the consolidation proposals of the ALI, ABA, and
Federal Courts Study Committee would extend to hundreds, if not thousands, of
"small" multicase litigations. The problems with the 20,000-case litigation, such
as that involving asbestos, suggest special consideration for a very small number
of instances of high-volume litigation.
The Committee seems to clearly recognize the distinction between general
complex litigation and the megacase. In this regard, the Committee recommends:
(3) For the small number of instances in which extraordinarily high numbers of injuries may have been caused by a

130. Id. at 44-45.
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single product or event, the courts should explore, and the
Federal Judicial Center should analyze and disseminate
information about, tailored procedures to avoid undue relitigation of pertinent issues and otherwise facilitate prompt,
economical and just disposition of claims. Congress should
be alert to the need for statutory change to facilitate resolution of such mega-cases.
Some products or events-asbestos injuries, for example-give rise to
thousands of claims that swamp several federal districts and state courts
with the task of relitigating similar issues and resolving individual
issues. Courts have determined that alternative procedures to reduce
relitigation are essential for some of these cases. They have managed
asbestos caseloads through mass trials or certification of all pending
cases in the district as a class action. Heavy judicial involvement in the
Agent Orange litigation led to a class-wide settlement. Congress
designed an administrative process for black lung victims to cope with
similar problems. But some alternatives have created their own
problems. For example, the black lung scheme led to heavy judicial
burdens. And the Asbestos Claims Facility and the Center for Claims
Resolution (established by prospective defendants and their insurers,
after negotiations with plaintiffs' lawyers) have not enjoyed great
success.
Thus, the Committee does not recommend such alternatives for
situations that do not present the great problems of the megacases. And
the pertinent characteristics of megacases are likely to differ enough to
make any generic approach unsuccessful. Rather, courts facing an
outburst of such litigation should consider alternatives to traditional
methods (claims-processing mechanisms, for example) once traditional
litigation has established liability. If they have the authority, they could
require or provide the option of simplified administrative processing
with surer, though possibly lesser, compensation.
The Federal Judicial Center should collect and analyze data on the new
methods and, as it thinks best, disseminate information to judges before
whom such litigation is pending. Studies of such alternatives might
suggest wider applications for them, and at some point, Congress may
wish to facilitate the resolution of megacases by altering the substantive
terms for relief or establishing alternative remedy schemes. Such
legislation might aid not only the federal courts but also state systems,
which sometimes carry the lion's share of mega-case burdens.1'

131. Id. at 46.
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D. ADR Under the Report of the
Federal Courts Study Committee
For the past decade and more, federal and state courts have adopted and
adapted alternative ADR techniques to standard procedures for handling civil
litigation.132 The objectives of these techniques have been to "reduce cost,
delay, and antagonism, and at the same time to preserve the time of judges for the
disputes that most need their attention". 33 Examples include:
*

*

*

*
*
*

"court-annexed arbitration," which usually requires a nonbinding hearing and award some months after filing and
before the parties may proceed to trial (if they do not accept
the award or settle);
the less formal "early neutral evaluation" procedure, in which
an experienced attorney meets with the parties and counsel
fairly soon after filing to discuss issues in a case and possible
claim values;
intensified trial-level settlement mediation by a magistrate or
judge (perhaps other than the one who would try the case), or
mediation at the trial or appellate level by professionals on
the court's staff;
optional "fast track" proceedings that provide for limited
discovery and early trial;
special masters for discovery and other matters in complex
cases; and
summary jury and bench trials, to provide the parties a nonbinding estimate of the case as a means of facilitating
settlement.134

The methods referenced above and covered in the report of the Federal Courts
Study Committee are those that federal courts might either require, or make
available to litigants, during the pretrial stages of civil litigation or on appeal
before full briefing and argument. The methods discussed do not include
arbitration, conciliation, mediation, and negotiation, and other procedures if they
operate outside the judicial system.

132. A 1983 amendment to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 16 specifically authorized judges and
litigants, at the pretrial conference, to "consider and take action with respect to... the possibility of
settlement or the use of extrajudicial procedures to resolve the dispute." FED. R. Civ. P. 16. In 1988,
the legislation that created this committee authorized the continuation of mandatory court-annexed
arbitration programs that had begun in ten judicial districts between 1977 and 1986. It also authorized
consensual programs in ten additional districts and imposed detailed requirements for reports by the
Administrative Office of the United States Courts and the Federal Judicial Center on the operation of
these programs.
133. Federal Courts Report, supra note 126, at 82.
134. tL
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The Committee has made several recommendations regarding the use of ADR
in federal courts. The first recommendation provides as follows:
1.

Congress should broaden statutory authorization for local rules for
alternative and supplementary procedures in civil litigation,
including rules for cost and fee incentives.

More specifically, Congress, subject to any sunset provisions it believes
desirable, should:
eliminate any doubt that all federal courts may adopt local rules
establishing dispute resolution mechanisms that complement or
supplement traditional civil pretrial, trial, and appellate procedures.
The enabling legislation should require participation by the local
bar, dispute resolution professionals, and the public in the drafting
of these local rules;
permit (but not require) district courts to include in their local
rules mandatory mechanisms such as mediation, early neutral
evaluation, and court-annexed arbitration, with limitations on types
of cases subject to mandatory reference, and authorization for
motions to exempt cases from an otherwise mandatory procedure;
and
forbid the creation of financial incentives in mandatory initial ADR
proceedings (except as a sanction for misconduct), but permit
experimental use of cost and fee incentives for parties who reject
arbitration hearing awards and fail later to improve on them, or
who reject and fail to improve on formal post-award settlement
offers.135
Although the Committee notes a number of concerns regarding court-annexed
ADR,'m it does not address possible concerns about the use of mandatory, courtannexed ADR in the context of consolidated, judicially-managed complex
litigation.
The second ADR recommendation of the Committee provides as follows:
2.

Congress should authorize and provide funds for sustained
experimentation with alternative and supplementary techniques,
subject to the guidelines recommended below and any other
limitations Congress may deem advisable.

135. Id. at 83-84.
136. Id. at 84.
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Like much else in the law, alternative devices are at the same time
established and evolving. Rigorous empirical analysis might reveal
these techniques' unanticipated consequences or their failure to provide
the benefits promised by their promoters. Accordingly, Congress should
authorize and fund sustained research on the ADR techniques adopted
as a result of the recommended legislation-as well as in areas other
than ADR where controlled experimentation may be valuable. The
authorization should extend to controlled experimentation-research that
subjects one group to the rule or procedure under analysis and subjects
a similar group to the existing system. Such research, if kept in place
long enough to produce sufficient data for meaningful comparative
analysis, is the most powerful social science research technique
available, and published reports on such experiments are essential to
advancing our knowledge about the results that alternative procedures
may provide.' 37
The Committee's third ADR recommendation is that the "Judicial Conference
should establish a committee to provide advice and guidance to courts about
alternative dispute resolution."'m Perhaps such a committee would look at the
impact of mandatory ADR and consolidated complex litigation on the rights of the
individual litigants.
V. MULTIPARTY, MULTIFORUM JURISDICTION ACT OF 1989 (H.R. 3406)
On Wednesday, October 4, 1989, the Honorable Robert W. Kastenmeier
introduced in the House of Representatives the "Kastenmeier Bill," officially
entitled the "H.R. 3406, the Multiparty, Multiforum Jurisdiction Act of 1989."
The Kastenmeier Bill was introduced to create a new federal court subject matter
jurisdiction which would be specially tailored to meet the problems created by
certain single-occurrence mass tort litigation.139 On February 28, 1990, the Subcommittee on Courts, Intellectual Property, and the Administration of Justice of
the House Judiciary Committee voted to report to the full Committee H.R. 3406.
Representative Kastenmeier offered an amendment in the nature of a
substitute which made several changes in the Multiparty, Multiforum Jurisdiction
Act of 1989. Specifically, the amendments limited the Bill to actions arising from
a single accident. Accident is, in turn, defined as a sudden accident, or natural
event culminating in an accident, that results in death or injury incurred at a

137. Id. at 85-86.
138. Id. at 86. As noted by the Committee, a Judicial Conference Committee, "operating under
the auspices of the Federal Judicial Center, can provide advice to federal courts on alternative and
supplementary civil litigation procedures, guidelines for the operation of such techniques, and help in
avoiding failed approaches.' It
139. 131 CONG. REc. E3275 (daily ed. October 4, 1989) (The Bill did not pass in the 101st
Congress, but may be reintroduced in 1991 in the 102d Congress).
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discrete location by at least 25 natural persons. Thus, the Kastenmeier Bill does
not extend to the mass tort or products liability litigation which is covered by the
ABA Mass Tort Proposal, the Complex Litigation Project, and the report of the
Federal Courts Study Committee.
H.R. 3406 would thus establish a mechanism for channeling all actions
arising from accidents into a single federal court for adjudication according to a
single body of state law.
To establish this consolidation mechanism, the Bill would (1) give the federal
courts original jurisdiction over actions arising from such disasters, (2) provide for
consolidation in one federal court of all federal court actions arising from any such
disaster, (3) allow defendants to remove any action from state court to federal
court that could have been brought in federal court in the first instance under the
bill, and (4) direct the federal district judge who gets the case to chose the state
law to be applied to all actions arising from the disaster, based on a laundry list
of considerations. 140
Section 2 of the Bill would enact a new Section 1367 of Title 28 giving the
federal district courts sitting in diversity original jurisdiction to hear single
accident cases of any civil action involving minimal diversity between adverse
parties. 141
By requiring only "minimal diversity," H.R. 3406 would make it significantly
easier for a party to invoke federal court jurisdiction. "Minimal diversity"
normally means that there need be only one plaintiff and one defendant in a case
who are citizens of different states. Under the Bill, there apparently need be no
diversity between any plaintiff and any defendant-only "minimal diversity"
between "adverse parties."
Section 4 of the Bill would amend Section 1407 of Title 28 (governing
multidistrict litigation) to allow a district court that gets multiple actions arising
from a large-scale disaster under H.R. 3406 to consolidate the actions for trial and
for the determination of liability and punitive damages. 42 The district court to
which the actions are transferred also may determine damages or remand the
actions to the courts in which they were brought for separate damages determinations.
Under existing law, transfer in multidistrict litigation is authorized only for
purposes of coordinating or consolidating pretrial proceedings. The actions are
then remanded to the districts in which they were brought for trials on liability and
damages.
Section 5 of the Bill would amend Section 1441 of Title 28 (governing
removal) to permit a defendant to remove any action from state court to federal
court that could have been brought infederal court in the first instance under the
Bill.

140. Id.

141. H.R. 3406, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. § 2 (1989).
142. Id. § 4.
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Section 6 would add a new Section 1658 to Title 28 directing a federal
district court, in an action brought under new Section 1367, to determine what
state's law should be applied to the action, based on a comprehensive "interest
analysis" taking into account 11 specified factors. The court's choice of law
determination would govern all other actions arising from the disaster, and all
elements of each action, unless federal law applies or the court specifically
provides that some other state's law shall apply. The bill "creates no Federal
substantive law."
Existing law provides that in any diversity case, the laws of the state in
which the case was brought provide the rules of decision. When a federal court
decision, it applies the choice of law rule of the state
must make a choice of 1law
43
in which the court sits.
H.R. 3406 would free the district judge of the obligation to follow the forum
state's--or any state's-choice of law rules. In so doing, it would undermine the
ability of the states to develop and apply their own law to disputes between private
persons in multiparty torts cases. 144
Presumably the transferee court under H.R. 3406 would have authority to
order the parties to participate in mandatory ADR procedures. However, as with
the ALl Complex Litigation Statutes, this matter is not specifically addressed.

VI. THE CIVIL LITIGATION PROJECT AND
THE CIVIL JUSTICE REFORM ACT OF 1990
To consider the perceived high litigation costs and delay that burden litigants
in the civil litigation system, Senator Joseph Biden, Chairman of the Senate
Judiciary Committee, suggested in August 1988 a working conference of
participants in the civil litigation system. The Brookings Institution and the
Foundation for Change, working with the Rand Institute for Civil Justice, brought
together a task force of 36 members to address the issues. The report of the task
force, Justice ForAll, 145 set forth a number of recommendations for change to
the civil system. Subsequently, legislation has been introduced in Congress to
address these issues.
A. The Civil Litigation Project
The recommendations in Justicefor All contain a number of suggestions for
case management and judicial coordination, including recommendations on ADR.
However, unlike the mandatory, court-annexed ADR process contemplated by
other proposals such as the ABA Mass Tort Proposal, the report provides impetus
for more voluntary procedures.

143. See 28 U.S.C. § 1652 (1948).
144. Cf Pacific Employers Ins. Co. v. Industrial Accident Comm'n, 306 U.S. 493, 501 (1939).
145. Report Justice for All: Reducing Costs and Delay in Civil Litigation (1989) [hereinafter
Justice for All].
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The ADR recommendations for the Civil Litigation Project as set forth in
Justice for All, provide as follows:
ProceduralRecommendation7: Provide in each district court's plan for
neutral evaluation procedures and mandatory scheduling or case
management conferences at the outset of all but the simplest of cases.
[COMMENT.]
Much unnecessary cost and delay can be avoided at the outset of
many cases through sensible case management evaluation and scheduling techniques. We have two specific recommendations in this area to
offer.
NeutralEvaluation and Alternative Dispute Resolution. First, we
suggest that each district court's plan require parties at the outset of all
but the simplest and most routine cases to attend a conference with a
neutral court representative to assess the suitability and desirability of
alternative dispute resolution (ADR) procedures. This would expand the
procedures now being used in the Northern District of California, where
volunteer attorneys meet with parties at an early stage to shape the
issues and the discovery process.
Interest in a variety of ADR techniques has accelerated in recent
years and covers a wide range of procedural devices: arbitration,
mediation, and nonbinding summary trials in which the attorneys
present brief summaries of their cases to juries without live testimony.
Although much research remains to be done about the effectiveness of
these techniques and about the circumstances to which specific ADR
procedures best apply, there is some anecdotal evidence that ADR can
help resolve disputes more quickly and at less cost than traditional
litigation. Accordingly, we believe that the cost savings from early
neutral evaluation outweigh any small additional costs of the procedure
at the "front end" of litigations.
Nevertheless, because the evidence of ADR is far from definitive
and because the optimal choice of specific ADR techniques varies from
case to case, it would be a mistake to freeze into the procedural rules
one or more particular techniques. Thus districts should experiment
with ADR procedures through the neutral evaluation mechanism. In
effect, we suggest that the district plans formalize the "multidoor
courthouse" concept that has been implemented in certain federal
districts and state courts. Congress should make funds available to
districts to experiment with different ADR mechanisms, with a body
designated to administer the funding program. As part of its ongoing
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1990
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assessment, the Federal Judicial Center should, in consultation with the
districts, evaluate the results of these experiments and, where appropriate, suggest their regular use among all districts.'
The Civil Litigation Project clearly envisions active judicial case management
to help streamline the civil litigation process in federal courts. However, the task
force behind the Civil Litigation Project has concluded that judicial case
management, or managerial judging, 14 7 can be pursued without sacrificing due
process protections accorded the litigants."' Nonetheless, in this context, it is
reasonable to foresee federal judges acting pursuant to any legislation enacted as
a result of the Civil Litigation Project, becoming much more aggressive in
managing mandatory alternative dispute resolution as an overall case management
tool.
B. Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990
On January 25, 1990, Representatives Brooks, Kastenmeier, Fish, and
Moorhead introduced the Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990 in the House of
Representatives, and the Bill was referred to the Committee on the Judiciary. 49
A companion bill was introduced in the Senate under the sponsorship of Senator
Joseph Biden, the initial coordinator for the Civil Litigation Project.' °
The Civil Justice Reform Act, as introduced in the House of Representatives,
contains thirty-five proposed findings of Congress which focus upon civil litigation
delay, expense, and judicial management.' 5' The Act also provides for differentiated case management of the type recommended in the report of the Civil
Litigation Project. 52
The proposed legislation would require that each United States District Court
develop a civil justice expense and delay reduction plan in accordance with the
provisions outlined in the proposed legislation. The plans would apply to all civil
proceedings. Each United States District Court would be directed to develop its
plan with a view toward facilitating deliberate adjudication on the merits in
appropriate cases, streamlining discovery, improving judicial case management,
and generally renewing the court's commitment to the just, speedy and inexpensive resolution of civil disputes. The proposed legislation specifies certain

146. Id. at 23-24.
147. Resnik, ManagerialJudges, 96 HARV. L REV. 374 (1982).
148. Justice for All, supra note 145, at 24-25.
149. Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990, H.R. 3898, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. (1990) [hereinafter
House Reform Act].
150. Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990, S. 2027, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. (1990).
151. House Reform Act, supra note 149, at 2-4 (Section 2 of the Act).
152. Id. at 5-9.
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shall be included in each civil justice expense and delay
requirements which
3
plan."1
reduction
As to requirements for alternative dispute resolution, the Civil Justice Reform
Act of 1990 will require the civil justice delay plans of the district courts to
include:
(11) An early neutral evaluation program, to which certain categories
of cases identified in each plan will be assigned and through which the
parties and their counsel present the legal and factual bases of their case
to a neutral court representative at a non-binding conference that takes
154
place at the earliest possible stage in the litigation.
The Act, by its own terms, focuses upon the need for judicial case
management. The early neutral evaluation conference, which may be mandatory
in certain cases, appears to be designed to provide parties with information on
ADR alternatives. If the parties do not voluntarily agree on an ADR procedure
which disposes of the litigation, it is not clear the extent to which the Civil Justice
Reform Act of 1990, with its emphasis on judicial case management, would foster
mandatory ADR as a part of the pretrial proceedings of the court.
VII. CASE MANAGEMENT VERSUS VOLUNTARY
ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION
The preceding discussion concerning proposals to overhaul the civil justice
system, with a particular emphasis on mass torts or complex litigation, discloses
a common theme of case consolidation and management. In order to try to
improve the efficiency of the administrative aspects of handling the litigation, the
various proposals focus upon consolidation of cases before a single judge,
typically a federal judge, and provide for extensive case management authority.
However, as judges are given an ever wider range of powers, the individual rights
of individual litigants are increasingly subsumed in the desire to make courts
efficient. In addition, toward the same objective of consolidation and efficient
case management, concepts of voluntary alternative dispute resolution are
transformed into court-annexed procedures that can be applied in a mandatory
manner by a transferee judge in a consolidated case.
This Article suggests that the emphasis on consolidation and case management is misplaced. Additionally, as the focus of consolidation and case
management brings alternative dispute resolution into the process, the focus on
mandatory alternative dispute resolution techniques, such as court-annexed
arbitration, is similarly misplaced. These techniques are being considered as tools
of the courts to manage cases and perhaps to force settlements. The adjudicatory
nature of mandatory alternative dispute resolution as contemplated by these plans

153. Id at 5.
154. Id. at 7-8.
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and proposals accentuates the already inappropriate emphasis upon forced
consolidation and multicase management.
From the standpoint of alternative dispute resolution it is urged that the
appropriate emphasis should be upon voluntary dispute resolution and upon the
dissemination of knowledge and information concerning the alternative dispute
resolution options which may be available. As a substitute for the mandatory
procedures denominated as alternative dispute resolution procedures in the
consolidation and case management proposals, concepts analogous to the multidoor courthouse and early neutral evaluation should be employed early on in the
dispute resolution process to focus the parties' attention on voluntary dispute
resolution.
One need only examine the recent litigation involving summary jury trials to
begin to appreciate the impact and difference between court-annexed "alternative
dispute resolution" procedures which are mandatorily imposed upon litigants, and
voluntary aliernative dispute resolution techniques which are utilized by agreement
of the parties to seek a common ground of settlement and dispute resolution.
A. Voluntary Versus MandatoryADR:
The Summary Jury Trial Example
The summary jury trial was originated in 1980 by Judge Thomas Lambros
155
The
of the United States District Court for the Northern District of Ohio.
summary jury trial seeks to (i) provide an inexpensive but accurate forecast of trial
156
outcomes and (ii) refine the settlement analysis or calculus of the parties.
A summary jury trial is analogous to a minitrial, except a jury hears the case
and a judge actually presides at the "trial." Generally, a summary jury trial is
ordered by a judge and conducted by either the judge or a magistrate. Some
judges, however, employ the procedure only if both parties agree, and there have
even been cases in which the attorneys themselves have requested a summary jury
trial. Although the formats vary, the summary jury trials generally are one-day
proceedings using a six-person jury. The jurors issue their nonbinding verdict
after hearing the presentations of opposing lawyers, but without the benefit of
witnesses' testimony.
A summary jury typically consists of six citizens chosen from the normal jury
pool, with opposing counsel permitted two preemptory challenges each. Jury
instructions are delivered by the judge, but are limited to the central issues. Some
judges inform the juries that their verdict is merely advisory, while others do not.
Counsel are given from one to three hours to present their case through a
combination of opening and closing arguments, plus a summary of the evidence.
In other words, the attorneys may have latitude to mingle argument and
representations of fact. The lawyers also are free to read briefly from depositions

155. See Lambros & Shunk, The Summary Jury Trial, 29 CLEv. ST. L REV. 43, 43 (1980).
156. See Associated Pa. Contractors v. Jannetta, 738 F. Supp. 891 (M.D. Pa. 1990); Maatman, The
Future of Summary Jury Trials in FederalCourts, 21 J. MARSHALL L REV. 455 (1988).
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and other documents. However, generally speaking, only evidence that would be
admissible at trial is permitted. Representations of fact must be based on
information obtained during discovery or by a professional representation that
counsel has spoken with the witness and is repeating that which the witness stated.
Counsel may present exhibits to the jurors. Objections by counsel are not
encouraged in the summary jury trial process, although conduct which is "Out of
bounds" may be subject to objections and rulings by the court.
To summarize, a typical summary jury trial procedure might include the
following steps: (1) Judge addresses the jury; (2) Plaintiff's presentation; (3)
Defendant's presentation; (4) Plaintiff's rebuttal; (5) Judge's instructions to jury
on the law; (6) Jury deliberation; and (7) Results (Some courts may require
unanimity on the question of liability; others do not).
Some courts which have used the summary jury trial procedure have allowed
the parties leeway to provide notebooks for the jury with key documents and
deposition summaries selected by the parties. The parties may utilize more than
one lawyer or "presenter" to present a summary jury trial. The summary jury trial
may or may not actually utilize live witnesses.
Some maintain that summary jury trials have become an increasingly popular
tool for alternative dispute resolution among the federal judiciary, particularly for
hard-to-settle cases that would monopolize a courtroom for weeks or months at a
time if they went to trial.1 57
In those cases in which a summary jury trial has failed to bring about a
settlement, the advisory verdict generally has proven to be an accurate forecast of
the subsequent jury verdict delivered following a full-scale trial. Judges and
lawyers familiar with the procedure credit its success in promoting settlements to
a variety of factors. These factors include: (1) The jury's advisory opinion
enables attorneys for both sides to get a better handle on how a full-fledged jury
would evaluate their case after sitting through an actual trial; (2) The clients get
a sense of the strength of the opposition's case because they are required to attend
the trial; and (3) The summary jury trial provides an emotional outlet for
clients-and their lawyers-by giving them an opportunity to have, in effect, their
"day in court."
If the six-person jury is unable to reach a unanimous verdict, each juror is
encouraged to render an individual verdict. A split verdict has occurred in about
ten percent of the summary jury trials. From the judge's point of view, when a
jury renders a split verdict it may be even more conducive to a settlement because
both sides can see the risk of going to trial.15 8
Rule 16(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides, in part, that at
pretrial conference "the participants ... may consider and take action with respect
to... the use of extrajudicial procedures to resolve the dispute." This rule was

157. See generally Levin & Golash,Alternative DisputeResolution in FederalDistrictCourts, 37
U. FLA. L REV. 29 (1985).
158. See Ranii, New Spurs to Settlement: Summary Jury Trials Gain Favor, NAT'L L J., June
10, 1985, at 1; Maatman, supra note 156, at 463.
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thought to provide the authority and framework for the use of summary jury trials
in federal court. In 1984, the Federal Judicial Conference of the United States
endorsed the use of the summary jury trial as an effective means of promoting the
59
fair and equitable settlement of potentially lengthy civil jury cases.'
The authority of the federal courts to order the use of summary jury trials,
even over the objection of a party, had not been seriously questioned until
Strandell v. Jackson County.' 60 The Seventh Circuit held in Strandell that the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure do not provide the authority for federal courts
to order a litigant into a summary jury trial over that litigant's objection. The
court concluded that "while the pretrial conference of Rule 16 was intended to
foster settlement through the use of extrajudicial procedures, it was not intended
to require that an unwilling litigant be sidetracked from the normal course of
litigation."' 61 The Seventh Circuit further concluded that the pretrial conference
was intended, under the rule, to be informational and factual, and was not intended
to be coercive. The court further noted that a mandatory summary jury trial could
affect the balancing between two core concepts under the rules: disclosure in the
62
pretrial discovery process and the protection of attorney work product.
According to the Seventh Circuit in Strandell, convenience, docket-clearing
expedience, and the regulation of procedure should not force a party to sacrifice
of the Federal rules, mandatory
its substantive rights. Absent a reworking
63
summary jury trials are not authorized.
As a threshold matter, some courts and commentators wonder whether the
federal courts have the statutory authority to empanel citizens selected from the
district court's master wheel to sit for purposes of an "advisory" and clearly "nonbinding" summary jury trial.'" Thus, even if the parties ask for or consent to
a summary jury trial, there is a legitimate question of authority of the federal
courts to proceed with a consensual summary jury trial. 65At least one court has
squarely held that such authority simply does not exist.
In McKay v. Ashland Oil, Inc.,'66 the court "respectfully disagreed" with the
Seventh Circuit decision in Strandell. In so doing, the McKay court held that a
local court rule allowing a judge to order parties to participate in non-binding
summary jury trials may be a valid exercise of the power of federal district courts.
The McKay case involved claims of wrongful discharge of the plaintiffs by
defendant Ashland Oil Corporation. The court characterized the case as complex

159. See Maatman, supra note 156, at 457.
160. 838 F.2d 884 (7th Cir. 1987).
161. Id. at 887.
162. Id at 888.
163. Id at 887.
164. See Hume v. M & C Management, 129 F.R.D. 506 (N.D. Ohio 1990); Maatman, supra note
156, at 477; Posner, The Summary Jury Trial and Other Methods of Alternative Dispute Resolution,
53 U. CM. L REv. 366, 386-387 (1986).
- 165. Hume v. M & C Management, 129 F.R.D. 506 (N.D. Ohio 1990).
166. 120 F.R.D. 43 (E.D. Ky. 1988); see also Arabian Am. Oil Co. v. Scarfone, 119 F.R.D. 448
(M.D. Fla. 1988) (the court may order parties to participate in a summary jury trial).
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because of the plaintiffs' claims that various business transactions by defendant
included illegal bribing of foreign officials, and that plaintiffs' discharge was due
to their unwillingness to cooperate in these schemes.' 67 The case was set for a
six-week trial. To facilitate settlement, and over the plaintiffs' objection, the court
ordered a five-day summary jury trial under its Local Rule 23. The plaintiffs
moved for reconsideration of this order based upon the Strandell decision. The
district court held on reconsideration that a mandatory summary jury trial is "a
valid pretrial settlement procedure. "1se
The local rule at issue in McKay provided that "A judge may, in his
discretion, set any civil case for summary jury trial or other alternative method of
dispute resolution."'6 The court concluded that Rule 23 authorized a mandatory
summary jury trial.
The McKay court observed that each federal district court is authorized by
Rule 83 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to adopt rules governing its
practice, so long as they are consistent with the federal rules.' 70 Local Rule 23
was deemed valid under Rule 83, since far greater intrusions into the autonomy
of trial lawyers and parties have been upheld under that rule. 17 1 For example,
Rhea v. Massey-Ferguson,Inc. 1 upheld Local Rule 32 of the Eastern District
of Michigan, which authorizes judges to refer certain cases to mandatory
mediation and imposes costs if a party does not better the evaluation of the
mediators by ten percent at trial. Many other cases, the McKay court notes, have
upheld referral to nonbinding arbitration, and a summary jury trial is essentially
nonbinding arbitration with an advisory jury instead of arbitrators. The McKay
local rule also met the U.S. Supreme Court's test for local rules under Colgrove
v. Battin,' in that it is not determinative of the outcome of litigation.

167. Id.
168. Id.
169. Id.
170. Id.

171. The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides:
Each district court by action of a majority of the judges thereof may from time to time,
after giving appropriate public notice and an opportunity to comment, make and amend
rules governing its practice not inconsistent with these rules. A local rule so adopted shall
take effect upon the date specified by the district court and shall remain in effect unless
amended by the district court or abrogated by the judicial council of the circuit in which
the district is located. Copies of rules and amendments so made by any district court shall
upon their promulgation be furnished to the judicial council and the Administrative Office
of the United States Courts and be made available to the public. In all cases not provided
for by rule, the district judges and magistrates may regulate their practice in any manner
not inconsistent with these rules or those of the district in which they act.
FED. R. Civ. P. 83.
172. 767 F.2d 266 (6th Cir. 1985).
173. 413 U.S. 149 (1973).
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If a court does order a summary jury trial, can the press attend? No, said the
trial court in CincinnatiGas & Electric Co. v. GeneralElectric Co. 174 However,
a group of newspapers argued on appeal to the Sixth Circuit on April 8, 1988, that
(i) the summary jury trial transcript should be opened, (ii) that the summary jury
should be released from a gag order, and (iii) that a restriction upon the access of
the press to court controlled proceedings (as distinguished from settlement
conferences or private ADR, such as arbitration) is unconstitutional.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit upheld the district
7
court's closure order in CincinnatiGas & Electric Co. v. GeneralElectric Co. ,
The CincinnatiGas case involved a suit brought in federal district court by the
owners of a failed nuclear power project. Litigation was initiated against General
Electric alleging that General Electric concealed flaws in the nuclear reactor
system it sold to the owners of the project. Plaintiffs claimed $360,000,000 in
damages as a result of the defective reactor system. The particular nuclear power
project at issue involved considerable public interest because of alleged cost
overruns and charges of corruption as well as the controversy surrounding the
general nuclear power issue. The power plant was eventually abandoned as the
site of an electric generating facility. Once the litigation was underway, the
district court judge entered a closure order to prevent the public and press from
attending a summary jury trial in the case. The judge ordered that a transcript be
made of the summary jury trial to preserve the substance of the proceeding in case
his decision regarding the closure order was overturned on appeal. 76
In upholding the closure order, the Sixth Circuit first concluded that
historically there has been no recognized right cf access to summary jury trial in
part because this mechanism has been in existence only since 1980. In this regard
the Sixth Circuit stated:
At every turn the summary jury trial is designed to facilitate pretrial
settlement of the litigation, much like a settlement conference. It is
important to note that the summary jury trial does not present any
matter for adjudication by the court. Thus, we find appellant's
argument to be unpersuasive and therefore hold that the "tradition of
accessibility" element has not been met.' 77
The Sixth Circuit also determined that public access did not play any
significant positive role in the functioning of the summary jury trial. Indeed, the
court concluded, that public access would actually be detrimental to the process

174. 117 F.R.D. 597 (S.D. Ohio 1987), affd, 854 F.2d 900 (1988), cert. denied sub nom.,
Cincinnati Post v. General Electric Co., 489 U.S. 1033 (1989).
175. 854 F.2d 900 (6th Cir. 1988), cert. denied sub nom., Cincinnati Post v. General Electric Co.,
489 U.S. 1033 (1989). See also Note, The Public'sNeed to Know vs. Effective Settlement Techniques:
The First Amendment Confronts the Summary Jury Trial, 1990 J. DisP. REsOL 149.
176. 117 F.R.D. at 600.
177. 854 F.2d at 904.
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if one of the parties has concerns about confidentiality, and would thus diminish
the effectiveness of the summary jury trial as a settlement device.,7 8
The argument of the newspapers opposing the closure order has been
summarized as follows:
The four Ohio newspapers that intervened to contest the closure order
argued that a summary jury trial bears too much resemblance to a trial
to be considered simply another settlement technique. For example, a
judge paid from tax dollars presides over the proceeding, and a jury of
citizens listens to the case and renders a verdict. In addition, the
proceeding serves as a forum for discussion of legal issues and, in this
case, matters of paramount public concern. The newspapers contrasted
the summary jury trial with a typical settlement conference to show that
the proceeding has more in common with the regular trial. They also
noted that the proceeding occurred after the final pretrial conference
with the judge. For these reasons, they argued, a summary jury trial is
essentially a trial procedure, and such procedures have historically been
open to the press and public. 79
Summary jury trials clearly represent but one ADR option. The foregoing
illustrates, however, that even in two-party litigation there may be a number of
questions and objectives regarding a mandatory summary jury trial procedure. In
consolidated mass tort cases, the parties approaching a summary jury trial will
need to address a full range of issues and concerns, including public and media
access to the summary jury trials.
B. Summary Jury Trials in Consolidated,
Complex Litigation
Given the ongoing debate concerning mandatory summary jury trials versus
voluntary summary jury trials; concerning the ability of the courts to use jurors for
summary jury trials; concerning public access to summary jury trials; what will
be the extent of this debate in the context of consolidated complex litigation? For
purposes of discussion, let us assume consolidation under the ALI's proposed
multicase, multiforum consolidation statute. Let us assume that 200 products
liability cases from federal and state courts are consolidated in one transferee
court.
Pursuant to the ALI's proposed statute, the transferee court will try to
identify individual and common issues. As to the individual issues, the transferee
court may order mandatory forms of alternative dispute resolution. In this regard,
it would be entirely within the authority of the transferee court to determine, and

178. Id.
179. Comment, Cincinnati Gas & Electric Co. v. General Electric Co.: Extinguishing the Light
on Summary Jury Trials, 49 OHio ST. L J. 1453, 1464 (1989).
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order, that the parties would be required to participate in a mandatory summary
jury trial on individual issues, before proceeding to trial in the case. From the
defense standpoint, the defendant manufacturer could be faced with 200 summary
jury trials on individual issues in the products liability claims. From an individual
plaintiff's standpoint, plaintiff would be forced into a summary jury trial which
might represent yet another hurdle or obstacle in plaintiff's path to the jury. In
addition, both the plaintiff and the defendant would, of necessity, undergo these
mandatory summary jury trials of individual issues in a context segregated from
the larger case involving the overarching common issues.
If one considers the possibility of consolidating 200 products liability cases
in a federal district court before Judge Thomas Lambros, then mandatory summary
jury trials would seem to be a very realistic possibility. The point is, however,
that any transferee judge would be in a position under the ALl proposal, or similar
proposals, to enforce mandatory summary jury trials. There seems to be little
discussion in any of the proposals as to whether this is a direction in which the
legal community wants to be heading.
Consider, for example, the other potential problems if a transferee judge
under one of the consolidation proposals discussed above, orders a summary jury
trial on the issue of causation, and allows the press to attend. Do litigants want
a federal judge to have this kind of power over mandatory ADR procedures?
Does the judicial system want this much concentrated power to force mandatory
ADR upon the parties?
C. Voluntary ADR: The Early Neutral Evaluation Example
Arbitration and mediation are ADR procedures which have been in existence
for some time and are utilized fairly extensively. However, parties and counsel
have also begun to devise hybrid dispute resolution procedures tailored to fit the
specific matter in controversy. These hybrid procedures tend to borrow aspects
of one or more of the established alternatives and modify or combine them to
satisfy the needs of the participants in a particular case.
Experience suggests that the analysis of a legal dispute may properly include
a review of available dispute resolution processes as well as the possibility of
devising a hybrid process more likely to succeed under the facts and circumstances
of the particular case. Many of the hybrid procedures encourage communication
by and among the participants not only as to the procedures to be utilized but also
the result sought to be obtained. However, alternative procedures, in and of
themselves, will not always provide more efficient and effective means of dispute
resolution. In some cases, the alternatives will simply not be appropriate.
Early neutral evaluation is a newly established procedure which provides for
a confidential evaluation session conducted by a neutral appointed by the court or
by some other mechanism. At the session, the parties briefly state their claims
and positions and with the help of the neutral attempt to reduce the scope of the
dispute by identifying areas of agreement and putting aside nonmaterial claims
while settlement possibilities are explored. Plans for sharing information may be
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/jdr/vol1990/iss2/3
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discussed. The evaluation is intended to help the parties view their cases more
objectively at an early enough stage in the process to make a difference. With
early evaluation, the neutral may be able to suggest specific ADR procedures to
resolve the identified issues still "on the table."
Parties can create opportunities for such assessment on their own initiative.
The services of a third party to serve as a neutral can be obtained if the parties so
desire. Basically, any time the parties are interested in expediting the dispute
resolution process, they should be able to do so. Even if all of the issues in a case
are not amenable to resolution outside the litigation process, it may be possible to
use one or more of these alternatives to narrow the controversy, leaving fewer
questions to litigate. Counsel and clients benefit from remaining alert to such
possibilities.
Some courts have taken the initiative to develop procedures for early neutral
evaluation. The United States District Court for the Northern District of California
developed and initiated an early neutral evaluation program in 1985. The results
of that narrowly-defined program encouraged the court to expand the early neutral
evaluation program.'8 ° The central feature of the early neutral evaluation
procedure in the Northern District of California is a confidential two-hour case
evaluation conference hosted by a neutral who is an experienced practitioner
appointed by the court under its inherent power to appoint special masters. The
court generally requires that the parties themselves, accompanied by counsel,
attend the early neutral evaluation session. 8'
The early neutral evaluation program in the Northern District of California
has had four major components. First, each party makes a 15- to 30-minute
presentation of its position in the litigation. Second, the neutral works with
counsel to try to reduce the scope of the dispute by identifying areas of agreement
and urging the lawyers to put tenuous theories on the "back burner" until
settlement possibilities are thoroughly explored. Third, the neutral evaluator
candidly assesses the strengths and weaknesses of the arguments, assesses the
evidence and offers a valuation of the case, for example, by estimating the
likelihood of liability and the dollar range of damages. Fourth, the neutral helps
the litigants devise a plan for sharing information and/or conducting discovery that
will prepare the case for serious settlement negotiations as soon as possible. 82
After hearing the parties' positions and making his or her assessment, the
neutral evaluator may consider and discuss the possibility of early settlement
procedures. If the parties are agreeable, the neutral may caucus privately with one
side at a time to encourage candor and to determine whether the parties' privatelyarticulated positions are close enough to make settlement a viable option.

AN EXPERIMENT TO EXPEDITE DISPUTE
180. REcKHAM, EARLY NEUTRAL EvALUATION:
RESOLUTION, IN ADR AND THE COURTS-A MANUAL FOR JUDGES AND LAWYERS: INNOVATIVE
STRATEGIES FOR CASE MANAGEMENT, EARLY SETrLEMENT AND DISPUTE RESOLUTION 165 (1987).
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182. Id. at 168.
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An important feature of this and other early neutral evaluation programs 1is
83
that the evaluation and planning conference takes place early in the litigation.
In some instances, the neutral evaluation session may be held even before the first
judicially-hosted status conference on the theory that using the judge's time at the
conference can be more productive if the parties have already met in the context
of a neutral evaluation conference.
Although the foregoing discussion represents one court's approach to early
neutral evaluation, it should be kept in mind that early neutral evaluation
procedures can provide a forum, at least in commercial litigation, for discussing
a lawsuit or a dispute, and can provide a vehicle for determining whether
alternative dispute resolution procedures might be of assistance.
General guidelines to a neutral in any early neutral evaluation program,
perhaps of the type contemplated in the Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990, might
include the following:
Make opening statement:
Describe purpose and procedure;
Set appropriate tone: informal, analytical, helpful.
Have plaintiff (through counsel) present its side of the case, pointing
where feasible to specific documents, witnesses, or other evidence that
support important factual contentions.
(During this phase, the neutral keeps his or her questions to a
minimum and does not permit others to interrupt with questions or
to cross-examine.)
*

Have defendant(s) present its (their) side(s) of the case.

*

Invite responsive presentations and observations by counsel and parties.

*

Ask questions of counsel and parties to clarify and probe.

*

Identify common ground, laying foundation for stipulations.

*

Identify key places where parties disagree.

*

Privately prepare case evaluation:
Likelihood of liability, noting central reasons; Likely range of
damages, noting major elements and calculations.

183. Id. at 168-69.
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Ask if parties and counsel want to explore settlement possibilities. If
so, consider private caucusing.
If no interest in exploring settlement, or if parties try but fail to reach
agreement, evaluator discloses his or her written evaluation and
explains the reasoning behind it.
If appropriate, and if consistent with the mandate from the court,
discuss the key discovery and/or motions that will equip the parties to
value the case, negotiate toward settlement, and efficiently prepare for
trial.
If appropriate, discuss follow-up: e.g., dates for key discovery or
informal exchanges of information (including copies to evaluator),
responses to offers, a second evaluation session.

The foregoing discussion of the operation of an early neutral evaluation
program may be contrasted with the mandatory imposition of specific ADR
techniques such as a court-mandated summary jury trial. Are the individual
interests of the litigants being served by voluntary, exploratory programs such as
early neutral evaluation or some prototype of the multidoor courthouse?
VIII. CONCLUSION: EMPHASIZING THE
VOLUNTARY ASPECTS OF ADR
The Final Report and Recommendations of the ABA Special Commission on
Mass Torts, the Complex Litigation Project, the Federal Courts Study Committee,
the Multicase, Multiforum Jurisdiction Act of 1989, the Civil Litigation Project,
and the Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990 all focus, in varying degrees and with
varying approaches, upon the question of case management in multicase,
multiforum litigation. A central feature of the more aggressive proposals, such as
the Complex Litigation Project, is multicase, multiforum consolidation into one
transferee court which will preside over consolidated litigation, through discovery,
and if it so determines, through trial.
The consolidation "packages" offer opportunities for managerial judging and
case management, all to the possible detriment of the individualized handling of
litigation by the individual parties to a lawsuit. The consolidation "packages" also,
however, will provide an impact on alternative dispute resolution as it may be
used in federal courts. While some of the proposals such as the Final Report and
Recommendations of the ABA Special Commission on Mass Torts specifically
address alternative dispute resolution, other proposals such as the Complex
Litigation Project are silent as to specifics on alternative dispute resolution.
However, in all of the proposals cited above, it is contemplated that the federal
courts in general, or the transferee courts in the case of consolidated actions in
particular, will exercise increasing authority over the case management aspects of
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litigation. This presumptively will include authority to identify, and require
participation in, various forms of court-annexed mandatory alternative dispute
resolution.
In such situations, however, alternative dispute resolution may be viewed
more in the context of a case management technique, or a pretrial litigation
management technique, rather than one of the traditional forms of voluntary
alternative dispute resolution.
If we recognize and acknowledge values of individualized case preparation
and case handling, and if we recognize and acknowledge values relating to the
voluntary aspects of alternative dispute resolution, perhaps there should be more
dialogue and examination concerning the consolidation proposals' use of
mandatory, court-annexed alternative dispute resolution procedures.
It cannot be said that voluntary participation in alternative dispute resolution
is in any way an antithesis to efficient case handling and management. Thus, for
example, we see that the Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990 proposes an early
neutral evaluation program through which the parties and their counsel will present
the legal and factual bases of their case to a neutral court representative at a
nonbinding conference, at the earliest possible stage in the litigation. As suggested
by the Report of the Civil Litigation Project, Justicefor All, the purpose of the
early neutral evaluation session will be to point litigants toward voluntary methods
of alternative dispute resolution. Although voluntary ADR may not be workable
or even desireable for personal injury cases, voluntary ADR and early neutral
evaluation may be welcome in commercial litigation.
Early neutral evaluation is consistent with the general concepts of the
multidoor courthouse in which the courthouse of the future serves as a dispute
resolution center offering an array of options for the resolution of legal disputes.
Should the dialogue on the various case management proposals include more
discussion of procedures to expose counsel and their clients to voluntary ADR
options? The preliminary evidence suggests that the answer may be yes.
Litigants, and particularly litigants in personal injury cases, should not be forced
into consolidated litigation or managed, mandatory ADR.
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